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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation investigates the role of two federal place-based programs, the 
New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), as 
tools for revitalizing distressed communities. The first empirical chapter organizes low-
income, high-poverty metropolitan census tracts into a typology based on their 
demographic, class status, built environment, and location characteristics in 2000. 
Principal components analysis uncovered three prominent neighborhood dimensions: 
class status, urbanization, and black socioeconomic isolation. These dimensions were 
entered into a cluster analysis, which identified ten distinct types of poor metropolitan 
neighborhoods. NMTC investment, LIHTC investment, and socioeconomic ascent were 
highly correlated across neighborhood types. This finding supports an assumption made 
in previous studies that developers, who play an important role in determining where 
subsidized projects are located, are motivated to seek out areas primed to undergo 
socioeconomic ascent. The neighborhood dimension describing the degree of 
urbanization was only baseline variable consistently related to both sources of place-
based investment and future socioeconomic ascent, suggesting that developer preferences 
are informed by observable urbanization-related factors. These findings were then 
applied to the development of a model for estimating the effects of place-based 
investment on a neighborhood’s socioeconomic trajectory. I use a variation of propensity 
score matching allowing for multiple treatment conditions to compare 2000 to 2010 
changes in income, poverty, unemployment, and home values between census tracts that 
received different combinations of investment through (a) both NMTC and LIHTC, (b) 
NMTC alone, (c) LIHTC alone, and (d) neither program. Findings revealed that the 
 
 
xii 
 
addition of NMTC had a positive impact on socioeconomic trajectories, while adding 
LIHTC-subsidized housing into a census tract could have a positive, negligible, or 
negative impact, depending on the comparison condition. Overall, this dissertation 
contributes to a better understanding of why certain types of poor places may be more 
likely to benefit from these types of market-driven place-based initiatives than others, and 
introduces a more integrated and nuanced approach for evaluating programs that operate 
within shared geographic space to address different facets of neighborhood poverty. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Cities are spatially organized into areas with varying levels of affluence and 
poverty. These patterns are important because “the community of which we are a part is 
both influenced by and influences our individual strengths and weaknesses (Edelman, 
2012).” Places that are home to disproportionate numbers of poor people begin to take on 
the characteristic vulnerabilities of their residents, exacerbating the disadvantages faced 
by the poor. There are consequences to living in a poor neighborhood even for 
individuals and families that are not poor (Coutts & Kawachi, 2006), but deleterious 
environmental conditions overwhelmingly affect those with the fewest protective 
resources (Galster, 2012; Sampson, 2012). Since 2000, the number of poor communities, 
and the number of poor people living in low-quality residential environments has 
increased sharply (P. A. Jargowsky, 2013); thus, the harmful effects of spatially 
concentrated poverty remain among the foremost social and policy concerns.  
As a community- level condition, poverty compounds the cycle of burdens placed 
on poor individuals and families (Sampson, 2012). Targeting the mechanisms through 
which the residential environment shapes outcomes is an important part of federal 
antipoverty strategy, with $82 billion in federal spending dedicated to place-based 
programs in 2012 alone (Kneebone & Berube, 2013). While there is broad agreement that 
addressing issues of place is critical to improving the life chances of vulnerable 
populations, the viability of strategies that specifically target socially and economically 
distressed places as an effective, efficient, and equitable means of improving the lives of 
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poor people remains a point of debate among academics and experts (Partridge & 
Rickman, 2006).  
1.1 The Debate over Place-based Policies 
Poverty is a complex and multifaceted problem, and its harmful effects work their 
way into the lives of people and communities through multiple levels of influence (Sallis 
et al., 2006). Policy efforts to address poverty are often designed to intervene at either the 
individual/family level or at the community level. Policies that treat the individual/family 
dimensions of poverty are often referred to as “people-based”, and those that act at the 
community level as “place-based.” People-based policies that transfer benefits directly to 
specific individuals or groups include means-tested programs such as the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; i.e. food stamps), cash assistance, and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC). Also falling into the people-based silo are housing voucher 
programs, such as the Moving to Opportunity program (de Souza Briggs, Popkin, & 
Goering, 2010), which address the harmful effects of living in a poor neighborhood by 
giving poor families the opportunity to move into places that provide better access to 
quality schools, increased employment opportunities, offer more and better local 
amenities and services, and are overall less socioeconomically isolating.  
In contrast, place-based programs are not designed with the intention of 
benefitting specific individuals. Instead, they steer resources into places where high 
numbers or percentages of poor people are located (Partridge & Rickman, 2006). There is 
an ongoing and unresolved debate regarding the wisdom of place-based strategies. 
Prominent criticisms include the argument that targeting places is often more expensive 
than targeting people (Deng, 2005); that low-income places are unable to effectively 
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harness investments and generate positive externalities (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2008); that 
tying benefits to specific geographic areas induces poor people to remain in place even if 
they would be better off moving elsewhere (Kraybill & Kilkenny, 2003) and similarly 
distorts the location decisions of businesses (Ladd, 1994); and that place-based 
investments are often siphoned off by a variety of unintended beneficiaries, including 
investors (Gurley-Calvez, Gilbert, Harper, Marples, & Daly, 2009), landowners, and 
higher-skilled commuters and new residents (Crane & Manville, 2008; Glaeser & 
Gottlieb, 2008). 
While the debate over the relative strengths and weaknesses of people- and place-
based approaches is far from settled (Neumark & Simpson, 2014), considerable 
theoretical and applied evidence exists to support the notion that intervening at the 
community level, if done well, can be part of an effective antipoverty strategy. For 
example, the claim that targeting places for investment distorts residential location 
decisions (Kraybill & Kilkenny, 2003) assumes a high level of mobility among the 
populations living in areas typically targeted by place-based policies (Ladd, 1994). The 
large body of spatial mismatch literature (Gobillon, Selod, & Zenou, 2007) suggests a 
legitimate use for strategies conducive to local employment growth, particularly in areas 
populated by low-income, low-skill, or minority workers (Arnott, 1998), given the 
persistence of barriers including commuting costs, housing affordability, and 
discrimination. 
Place-based policies are also often criticized for wastefulness and inefficiency. 
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) make the case that the strength of place-targeting strategies 
is undercut by the inability of economically disadvantaged places to leverage investments 
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into sufficient positive externalities for the surrounding area. A related concern is that the 
resources injected into poor communities do little to help current residents, as benefits are 
too easily siphoned off by unintended beneficiaries including investors, landowners, 
higher-skilled commuters, and new residents (Crane & Manville, 2008; Glaeser & 
Gottlieb, 2008; Gurley-Calvez, Gilbert, Harper, Marples, & Daly, 2009). While both 
arguments highlight legitimate causes for concern, evidence from a recent evaluation of 
the place-based Empowerment Zone (EZ) program suggests that neither is a foregone 
outcome. Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2010) found that the benefits generated by EZ 
investment into low-income census tracts significantly exceeded costs by raising 
productivity in the surrounding area, increasing total employment in targeted tracts and 
generating substantial wage increases for residents. 
Targeting the places where poor people live has also been characterized as a more 
expensive means to an end that could be more efficiently realized by providing resources 
directly to needy individuals and families. Yet Richter, Sniderman, Klesta, and Manzo 
(2013) challenge the premise of judging place-based programs solely based on cost-
effectiveness, as the benefits generated are often difficult to quantify in simple dollars-
per-unit terms. Along the same lines, Davidson (2009) rejects the strict dichotomy of 
person-versus-place that drives the debate, as the experiences of a local population 
invariably bleed into facets of place, while upstream social and environmental 
mechanisms directly impact people. These final two points suggest the need for a more 
nuanced take on the role of place-based policies.  
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1.2 Study Overview 
Given the overwhelming size and complexity of poverty and its community-level 
dimensions, the debate over place-based policies is unlikely to be resolved any time soon 
(Teitz & Chapple, 1998). Still, there are numerous opportunities for moving the 
discussion forward. This dissertation offers new insights into several underexplored areas 
of research on place-based policies by investigating investments made into poor 
neighborhoods during the 2000s through two prominent federal programs, the New 
Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC).  
A lack of access to the financial resources critical to fostering local development 
activity is one of the root causes of persistent neighborhood poverty (Teitz & Chapple, 
1998). Both NMTC and LIHTC address this market failure by providing incentives to 
investors, businesses, and for-profit and non-profit developers that minimize the risks- 
both real and perceived- and maximize the potential benefits of investing in 
socioeconomically distressed areas. Given this shared purpose, NMTC and LIHTC 
incorporate many of the same policy design elements, target closely overlapping subsets 
of low-income, high-poverty census tracts, and rely on the participation of similar market 
actors to achieve core program goals of increased investment in locations and types of 
development that have suffered from chronic underinvestment.  
Though similar in terms of policy design, NMTC and LIHTC are notably 
different in the types of development activity they support: NMTC is an economic 
development program that supports new and expanding businesses, as well as a variety of 
non-residential real estate projects in distressed census tracts (CDFI Fund, 2012), while 
LIHTC has for the last three decades served as the federal government’s most important 
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program for increasing the supply of affordable housing for low-income families (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014). 
This dissertation represents the first effort to examine NMTC and LIHTC together 
within in a single study. This research consists of two empirical chapters focused on the 
policy design similarities underlying NMTC and LIHTC, as well as the differences in the 
kinds of development activity each program supports. The first empirical chapter 
investigates the locational patterns of NMTC and LIHTC investment across different 
types of poor neighborhoods. The second chapter examines the effects of NMTC and 
LIHTC investment on neighborhood socioeconomic conditions.  
 
1.2.1 NMTC and LIHTC Locational Patterns 
Income and poverty levels in the census tract in which a proposed project is 
located are the primary factors for determining eligibility for both NMTC and LIHTC. 
For NMTC, the requirement is that either the poverty rate must be greater than 20 
percent, or median family income (MFI) in the census tract must be less than 80 percent 
of MFI in the surrounding metro area or state, whichever is greater (MFI ratio). While 
LIHTC can be used in any location, regardless of local socioeconomic conditions, 
significantly more generous incentives are available for affordable housing placed into 
census tract with greater than 25 percent poverty or an MFI ratio below 60 percent.  
The locations of NMTC- and LIHTC-subsidized projects are not selected at 
random from the pool of all eligible census tracts. Given their similar policy designs, 
similar combinations of factors affect the likelihood that an eligible census tract will be 
targeted for NMTC or LIHTC. These factors include federal provisions that encourage 
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development in locations meeting various additional requirements beyond the basic 
eligibility criteria described above, the decisions of the entities that administer NMTC 
and LIHTC in determining which applications for program financing to select, and the 
location decisions of the developers, businesses, and nonprofits that use these programs 
as a source of financing.  
Understanding the treatment selection process is critical for estimating treatment 
effects. Unfortunately, several key drivers of NMTC and LIHTC treatment selection are 
difficult to observe, complicating efforts to develop quasiexperimental studies that can 
offer convincing causal arguments. In particular, the decision-making process of 
developers has been identified in previous studies of both NMTC and LIHTC as an 
important, yet unobservable, determinant of treatment selection. A primary purpose of the 
first empirical chapter is to better understand what differentiates the minority of census 
tracts targeted for NMTC and/or LIHTC investment from the majority that meet the 
relevant eligibility requirements, but that are not selected as locations for subsidized 
development activity.   
I begin the study by using principal components analysis (PCA) to condense the 
demographic, class status, housing, and location characteristics of low-income, high-
poverty metropolitan census tracts in 2000 into a theoretically meaningful set of 
neighborhood dimensions. These dimensions are then entered into a cluster analysis to 
organize census tracts into a typology of poor metropolitan neighborhoods in 2000.  
This neighborhood typology serves as the basis for examining patterns of 
socioeconomic change, NMTC investment, and LIHTC investment during the 2000s. In 
previous evaluations, it has been assumed that the actors responsible for selecting the 
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sites for NMTC- and LIHTC-subsidized projects seek out locations that they expect to 
perform strongly in the future (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Harger & 
Ross, 2014). Thus, it is predicted that NMTC and LIHTC investment activity during the 
2000s was similarly clustered in the types of poor neighborhoods that possessed 
combinations of characteristics in 2000 that suggested a strong chance of experiencing 
socioeconomic ascent by 2010.  
This detailed exploration of NMTC and LIHTC locational patterns offers 
important insights into some of the basic assumptions made about these kinds of market-
driven, place-based policies. For one, any neighborhood types where NMTC investment, 
LIHTC investment, and future socioeconomic ascent all come into alignment are likely to 
be important for understanding the decision-making process of developers. More 
specifically, I argue that the neighborhood features that define these neighborhood types 
represent a strong approximation of the latent construct of market actor preferences.  
1.2.2 NMTC and LIHTC Socioeconomic Effects 
The second empirical chapter examines the effects of NMTC and LIHTC 
investment on local socioeconomic conditions. As in earlier studies, I focus on changes in 
indicators of population and neighborhood well-being in census tracts that received 
program treatment. The current study breaks new ground, however, because the overlaps 
between NMTC and LIHTC have never been addressed. The first empirical chapter finds 
that, as predicted, NMTC and LIHTC resources tend to flow into similar kinds of poor 
neighborhoods, given similarities in policy structure, administration, and the market-
based mechanisms employed to steer investment into eligible locations. Considering 
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these results, failing to account for LIHTC activity in an evaluation of NMTC (and vice 
versa) raises serious concerns of biased estimates due to omitted variable bias. 
This part of the study uses matching techniques to identify suitable comparison 
groups for three discrete treatment conditions: NMTC investment only, LIHTC 
investment only, or both NMTC and LIHTC investment. In addition to the traditional no-
treatment counterfactual, I also estimate the differences of receiving two different 
treatment conditions.   
1.3 Study Organization 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of NMTC and LIHTC policy structures, reviews 
the extant literature on the socioeconomic effects of NMTC and LIHTC investment in 
low-income, high-poverty census tracts, and discusses some of the key issues that have 
haunted past investigations. The empirical work is carried out in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 synthesizes the overall findings, discusses the limitations and policy 
implications of this work, and considers future research directions.  
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
Until the 1930s, antipoverty efforts that treated poverty as a community- level 
condition were mainly led by local governments, religious groups, and civic 
organizations (Von Hoffman, 2012). It took the increasing urbanization of the early 20th 
century along with the wholesale devastation of the Great Depression for the federal 
government to become heavily involved. FDR’s New Deal saw to it that local efforts to 
combat the problems of urban poverty received new national attention (Whisenant, 
2014); for example, by providing federal funding to support state and local planning 
activities (Levy, 2009).  
Housing policy is one area in which the federal government was especially active. 
Unfortunately, the housing programs that emerged around this time often contributed to 
the patterns of social and economic isolation that developed over the course of the 20th 
century. Though providing new opportunities for millions and being responsible for 
completely reshaping the composition of urban America, these programs were often 
explicitly discriminatory. The 1934 Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) 
revolutionized the housing market by introducing more favorable loan conditions and 
opening the possibility of homeownership for the first time to many. Soon after, the 
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and GI Bill made homeownership even easier by 
making the federal government the insurer of millions of home loans and offering 
attractive interest rates (Greenberg, 1997; Schill & Wachter, 1995). Unfortunately, the 
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structure of these programs ensured that these opportunities were not equally available to 
all Americans. For example, the FHA would not insure mortgages in poor, racially mixed 
neighborhoods. As a result, most FHA activity took place in new, racially segregated 
suburban areas (Gotham, 2000). In conjunction the rapidly changing transportation 
infrastructure that made the outlying areas surrounding central cities into feasible 
locations for industry, commerce and housing, these early housing programs provided the 
fuel for a self-reinforcing process of disinvestment, crime, and other social issues mainly 
affecting the poor, minority residents of inner city neighborhoods that took hold in the 
ensuing decades.  
Although the 1960s saw an evolution in the federal approach to urban 
revitalization through the introduction of initiatives like the Model Cities Program, as 
well as the gains made by the civil rights movement, it was not until the 1970s that policy 
changes with significant enforcement mechanisms began to take effect. The 1975 Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) required lenders to report their lending activities at 
the census tract level on an annual basis. The result was significantly more 
accountability, as lenders are now required to make public records on the loans provided 
to individuals in order to ensure that they are meeting their communities’ needs and not 
engaging in discriminatory lending practices  (FFIEC, 2013). Similarly, the 1977 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) required insured lenders to take steps to ensure that 
they are meeting the financing needs of their entire service area, including low- and 
moderate-income communities. Lenders are graded based on the degree to which they 
satisfy this mandate (Reserve, 2014).   
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The decision-making process for many New Deal programs represented a top-
down approach that allowed little room for the input of the local people most directly 
impacted by the Depression as well as efforts to improve conditions (Von Hoffman, 
2012). In the wake of the shift away from top-down community revitalization policies 
with few accountability or equity checks came a new group of programs that emphasized 
both local control over the decision-making process and remedying the damage caused by 
earlier federal policies. One of the earliest and most well-known of these policies is the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), a product of the Community 
Development Act of 1974. CDBGs are given out to municipalities on a formula basis, 
and leave communities with more discretion over the use of these funds than did earlier 
federal programs. One significant caveat to this is that the majority of CDBG funds are to 
be used to benefit low- and moderate-income people (Levy, 2009). NMTC and LIHTC 
share much of the substance of CDBG; in particular, an emphasis on harnessing the 
wisdom of local markets into the revitalization process. 
2.2 The New Markets Tax Credit 
While the United States’ history of growth and economic prosperity is the result 
of a system that provides broad access to capital (Barr, 2002), many lower-income 
communities have been handicapped by a chronic lack of access to the financial 
resources critical for creating and supporting economic activity. Inequitable lending 
practices from the past that prevented the flow of investment into poor places and 
populations have had significant and long-lasting impacts. The goal of NMTC is to 
eliminate and compensate for the forces that have left many communities severely 
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underinvested by addressing the persistent perception that poor places represent increased 
investment and business risk (Abravanel, 2010).  
Introduced in the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, NMTC is 
administered by the US Department of the Treasury through the Community 
Development Financial Institution (CDFI) Fund. The CDFI Fund certifies local financial 
institutions, known as Community Development Entities (CDEs), to apply for one or 
more of several tax credit and grant programs, including NMTC. CDEs specialize in 
providing financial services to traditionally underserved individuals, businesses, and 
communities. The primary function of NMTC is to increase the flow of private individual 
and corporate investment into distressed communities. Through 13 rounds of allocations, 
the CDFI Fund has awarded over $50 billion in tax credit authority to CDEs through 
NMTC (Fund, 2017b). 
NMTC is a competitive program in which certified CDEs apply to the CDFI Fund 
for the authorization to grant tax credits to investors. In exchange for making an equity 
investment into a CDE, the investor receives a tax credit valued at 39 percent of the 
amount invested.  The credit is claimed on the investor’s federal income taxes over the 
course of seven years: five percent of the investment amount is credited for each of the 
first three years, and six percent is credited the remaining four years. Thus, an investment 
of $1 million would yield $50,000 in tax credits per year in years 1-3 and $60,000 per 
year in years 4-7. At the end of seven years, the investor receives back the principal 
investment plus any accrued interest (Black & Caputo, 2013). Investors often view low-
income locations as high-risk and low-reward. The tax credit helps to overcome this 
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perception by offering investors a minimum guaranteed return on their investment. CDEs 
use the capital raised from private and corporate investors to offer financing for projects 
located in eligible census tracts, typically at more favorable terms than are available 
through conventional financing sources (Abravanel et al., 2013; CDFI Fund, 2012). A 
visualization of NMTC structure is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. NMTC Structure (IRS, 2010) 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the basic requirements for NMTC eligibility are:  
 median family income in the census tract less than 80 percent of income in the 
greater of the surrounding metropolitan area or state (MFI ratio), or 
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 poverty rate greater than 20 percent 
While any census tract meeting either the MFI ratio or poverty rate threshold is 
eligible for NMTC, the application for NMTC allocation authority indicates that CDEs 
are scored more favorably if they commit to making at least 75 percent of investments 
into businesses or developments located in areas of “severe distress,” defined as census 
tracts with MFI ratio less than 60 percent, poverty rate greater than 30 percent, or 
unemployment rate at least 1.5 times the national average. CDEs may also be scored 
more favorably if they commit to adhering to two or more other conditions, such as 
investing in places that are more distressed than the basic thresholds require, but not 
sufficiently so to be designated as “severe distress,” plus into difficult development areas 
such as brownfields, FEMA-designated disaster areas, and certain rural areas, or in 
projects that are owned by low-income persons, or that will primarily employ or serve 
low-income persons (Fund, 2017a).  
 
2.2.1 Current state of NMTC literature 
Evidence that NMTC is an effective tool for overcoming traditional biases against 
low-income areas is an important benchmark of program success. The perception that 
poor communities present increased business and investment risk is not unfounded; yet it 
is also recognized that there are opportunities to be found in such places, given 
significant unmet market demand (Porter, 1997). The hope is that an initial round of 
NMTC-incentivized investment will begin to erode traditional biases against underserved 
communities and make private investors more willing to consider the market 
opportunities in poor neighborhoods. Limited evidence is beginning to emerge suggest ing 
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that NMTC can be an effective catalyst for private investment (Harger & Ross, 2014); 
however, others have been critical of NMTC for failing to live up to this goal (Forbes, 
2006; Swack, Hangen, & Northrup, 2015). 
A related concern is that NMTC may be used by investors to subsidize 
investments that would have been made even in the absence of the program. Using an 
instrumental variable and propensity score matching approach, Gurley-Calvez, Gilbert, 
Harper, Marples, & Daly (2009) examined data from the CDFI Fund and the IRS to 
determine the effect of NMTC on individual and corporate investment behavior between 
2000 and 2004. The authors found that the introduction of NMTC as an investment 
opportunity in 2003 had a significant impact on the behavior of individual investors, as 
the differences in investment activity between individual investors and a comparison 
group in 2000 was significantly smaller than it was in 2004, by which time there was 
opportunity to invest in NMTC. On the other hand, there was no significant difference in 
the change between corporate NMTC investors and a comparison group over the same 
time period. These mixed findings are attributed to two primary factors. First, individuals 
are more likely to use NMTC as an opportunity to invest in distressed communities to 
fulfill social or ethical goals. Second, there are already mechanisms in place for inducing 
corporate investors to invest in distressed and underserved places. 
Evaluations have also focused on the degree to which NMTC-subsidized projects 
are relevant to the needs and capacities of the local population. As long as a for-profit or 
non-profit entity can demonstrate that a substantial amount of its activity takes place 
within an eligible census tract, there are relatively few formal restrictions placed on the 
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specific kinds of activities that would disqualify it from being classified as a qualified 
active low-income business (QALICB), and thus eligible for NMTC financing (IRS, 
2010). Some have argued that this lack of oversight sometimes leads to the use of NMTC 
for projects that do little to benefit local residents (Bokath, 2010).  However, evaluations 
have generally found that in this respect, program provisions have been effective at 
decreasing the risk of NMTC being used for projects incompatible with program goals or 
local needs. For example, a survey of CDEs found a strong emphasis on supporting 
projects likely to benefit lower-income populations, such as manufacturing, education, 
and healthcare facilities (NMTCC, 2012). That demand for tax credit allocation authority 
by CDEs greatly outstrips the supply of funds further alleviates this concern; high 
demand combined with a competitive application process that takes into consideration 
potential community impact has the effect of filtering out projects not in the spirit of 
NMTC (Abravanel et al., 2013). On the other hand, Brostek (2009) found that between 
2005 and 2008, even after controlling for other relevant factors, minority-owned CDEs 
were rated lower by the CDFI Fund during the competitive application process and were 
less likely to receive tax credit allocation authority. 
 
2.3 The Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
LIHTC was introduced in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and has since grown to 
become the federal government’s most important mechanism for creating new affordable 
rental housing for low-income families (Cummings & DiPasquale, 1999). As of 2012, 
LIHTC has helped finance the construction and rehabilitation of over 2.5 million 
affordable housing units (Erickson, Galloway, & Cytron, 2012).  
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Like NMTC, LIHTC is a federal program housed within the Department of the 
Treasury. However, LIHTC is primarily administered at the state level, as funding is 
allocated annually by the IRS to each state’s housing credit agency (HCA) on a per-capita 
basis. In 1986, the allocation was $1.25 per state resident. This was later increased to 
$1.75 per resident, and as of 2003, the allocation adjusts annually to account for inflation 
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014).  
To receive LIHTC financing, a housing developer applies for tax credits to 
support a specific development to the HCA of the state in which the development is 
located. The developer then sells the tax credits to private investors in exchange for the 
purchase of an equity stake in the development. The credit is applied to the investor’s 
income tax liability over the next ten years, and the equity investment is used to finance 
the completion of the housing development project (Desai, Dharmapala, & Singhal, 
2008). Figure 2 provides a visualization of the LIHTC policy structure.  
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Figure 2: LIHTC structure (White, 1997) 
 
 
LIHTC is not a straightforward place-based policy in the same sense as NMTC, as 
affordable housing development in any location is eligible for LIHTC, regardless of local 
economic conditions. Instead of a strict location-based requirement, LIHTC 
developments must be occupied by a minimum number of low-income people. 
Specifically, at least 20 percent of renters must earn less than half of the area median 
gross income (AMI), or at least 40 percent of renters must earn less than 60 percent of 
AMI (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014).  
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In practice, however, LIHTC has clear place-based implications due to a 
provision that awards an additional 30 percent in tax credits for affordable housing units 
placed into Qualified Census Tracts (QCTs). The designation of a census tract as a QCT 
is based on the same two indicators of local economic distress used to determine NMTC 
eligibility. However, the thresholds required for QCT status are stricter. To be designated 
a QCT, either the MFI ratio must be less than 60 percent (versus 80 percent for NMTC), 
or the poverty rate must be greater than 25 percent (versus 20 percent for NMTC).  
2.4 NMTC and LIHTC Socioeconomic Effects 
When NMTC was first introduced by Congress in 2000, the stated intent for the 
new program was that it would “result in the creation of jobs and material improvement 
in the lives of residents of low-income communities (IRS, 2010).” Insufficient access to 
economic opportunity is widely recognized as one of the root causes of concentrated 
poverty (Galster, 2012; Teitz & Chapple, 1998; Wilson, 2011). Thus, the ultimate sign of 
NMTC success would come from evidence that the economic development activity it 
supports has a meaningful positive impact on the socioeconomic well-being of local 
residents.  
To date, only one study has specifically examined the effects of NMTC 
investment on community conditions. Freedman (2012) used a regression discontinuity 
design to compare the differences in socioeconomic trajectories from 2000 to 2010 of 
census tracts that were barely eligible for NMTC to those that were barely ineligible, on 
the basis of the MFI ratio requirement. Freedman found that census tracts on the eligible 
side of the 80 percent threshold experienced significant improvements in poverty rates 
and unemployment rates compared to otherwise similar census tracts on the ineligible 
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side of the threshold. On the other hand, there were no significant differences in home 
value growth, income growth, or housing turnover. 
The role of LIHTC as a tool for revitalizing distressed neighborhoods has 
received considerably more attention. In particular, the provision of LIHTC that provides 
additional tax credits for housing placed into QCTs has been a source of focus, and even 
controversy. By providing an additional incentive for developers to create housing 
exclusively for poor families into neighborhoods that are already disproportionately poor, 
LIHTC on the surface appears to contradict the last thirty years of federal housing policy 
by reinforcing existing patterns of concentrated poverty. HUD’s HOPE VI program was 
introduced in 1992 for the purpose of deconcentrating poverty through the replacement of 
substandard public housing developments, which were typically located in low-income 
areas and only housed low-income families, with mixed-income developments (Popkin, 
2004). Since then, a number of other federal efforts, such as the Empowerment Zone 
program (Forbes, 2006; Oakley & Tsao, 2007), Moving to Opportunity (de Souza Briggs 
et al., 2010), and Choice Neighborhoods (Wilson, 2010) have also focused on tackling 
the problems of concentrated poverty.   
The reality is more complex, however, as LIHTC-subsidized development activity 
in low-income areas may generate positive spillovers in the surrounding area and help 
foster further revitalization (Ellen, O'Regan, & Voicu, 2009). If an LIHTC-subsidized 
development upgrades existing low-quality housing or develops parcels of vacant and 
abandoned land, these improvements may outweigh the poverty-concentrating effects of 
new low-income housing units (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009). In addition, the federal 
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provisions of LIHTC were updated in 2000 to require states to give preference to housing 
projects that are integrated into a larger community revitalization plan. While some states 
have taken this requirement seriously, others appear to only pay it lip service in 
developing state-level guidelines for allocating LIHTC resources (Johnson, 2014); 
nevertheless, this more holistic approach to the siting of LIHTC developments within 
low-income areas would appear to ease at least some of the conflict between LIHTC and 
the federal government’s current goals in housing and antipoverty policy.  
Whether the positive spillovers of new development and the preference for 
projects taking place within the context of a community revitalization plan outweigh the 
potential for LIHTC to reinforce patterns of concentrated poverty has not been 
definitively established in the literature. In a study of the interaction between LIHTC and 
the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, which allows low-income households to 
secure housing in lower-poverty areas by subsidizing their rent in market-rate units, 
Williamson, Smith, & Strambi-Kramer (2009) found that HCVs in Florida did not 
subsidize rent enough to allow the lowest-income households to find affordable housing 
within the private market. As a result, HCVs were disproportionately used by the very 
poorest families to secure housing in LIHTC units located in QCTs. Thus, the siting of 
LIHTC units in low-income areas may reinforce the tendency for families receiving 
housing vouchers to choose locations that are relatively poor (Galvez, 2010), particularly 
if poor households use LIHTC to supplement subsidies received through other housing 
programs. On the other hand, Horn & O'Regan (2011) found no evidence that LIHTC 
locational patterns lead to increased racial segregation, an issue that is intrinsically tied to 
patterns of economic isolation (Massey, 1993; Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Wilson, 2012). 
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If there is any conclusion to be drawn from the extant literature on LIHTC, it is 
that the local socioeconomic context, including the level of economic distress and 
preexisting socioeconomic trends, in large part determine whether LIHTC-subsidized 
development is likely to have a positive or negative impact on community conditions. In 
one of the few national-level studies to date, Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) found that 
from 1990 to 2000, the neighborhood effects of LIHTC investment depended on whether 
a LIHTC development was placed into a gentrifying, stable, or declining neighborhood. 
When placed into “gentrifying” census tracts, in which property values increased from 
1980 to 1990, LIHTC developments led to increased household turnover and declines in 
income. On the other hand, when placed into stable or declining areas, LIHTC had a 
positive impact on property values.  
2.5 Research Challenges 
2.5.1 Unobserved drivers of site selection 
Previous evaluations of NMTC and LIHTC have been plagued by at least two 
methodological issues. The first is that the drivers of site selection in NMTC and LIHTC 
are not well understood. However, an important takeaway from the extant literature is 
that there are different kinds of poor places. Census tracts eligible for NMTC and LIHTC 
vary by the severity of socioeconomic distress, recent socioeconomic trajectory, location-
both regionally and within a particular metropolitan area, and in many other ways. 
Understanding these differences may hold the key to understanding why some eligible 
locations may be more likely targets for place-based investment than others, and for those 
places that are targeted, both the degree and direction of socioeconomic change that the 
investment is likely to produce.  
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Because current federal initiatives address market failures by embracing market 
forces, theory and evidence suggest that the locational patterns of place-based investment 
are driven in part on the expectations of market actors about the current and future 
economic viability of low-income neighborhoods. Therefore, place-based investment 
may be disproportionately concentrated in poor places that, at least in the eyes of 
developers, are relatively well-positioned to experience socioeconomic ascent.  
It is unlikely that NMTC and LIHTC developers are indifferent between potential 
project locations. An evaluation of NMTC by Abravanel et al. (2013) found that most of 
the businesses that had received program financing owned the property for an approved 
project prior to making the decision to apply for NMTC. As taking ownership of a 
property typically precedes the decision to apply for NMTC, this finding suggests that the 
neighborhoods into which NMTC-subsidized projects are placed must possess certain 
advantages that overcome the traditional bias against economically distressed places. 
There is also some evidence that the locational patterns of LIHTC activity are influenced 
by gravitational forces that favor some neighborhoods over others. Specifically, Eriksen 
et al. (2007) found that LIHTC-subsidized housing development tends to be located in 
areas where large amounts of unsubsidized housing development activity would be 
expected.  
Though there is some evidence available to help inform the preference structures 
of developers, the specific neighborhood factors that influence site selection have not 
been explored in depth for either NMTC or LIHTC. Thus, a limitation noted in previous 
studies examining the effects of program treatment on neighborhood socioeconomic 
trajectories is the possibility of model misspecification due to unobserved developer 
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preferences for certain kinds of poor places (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009; Ellen et al., 
2009; Freedman, 2012). Concern over this potential source of bias is downplayed by the 
argument that if comparison tracts are similar to treated ones on observed baseline 
characteristics, then they are most likely similar on unobserved factors as well. 
Unfortunately, this assumption is impossible to verify, because there is no direct method 
for determining the similarity of observations on variables that are not measured.  
Overall, little has been done to examine developers’ locational preferences as 
drivers of NMTC or LIHTC site selection. Similarly, little has been done to specify the 
structure of the relationship between unobserved determinants of project location and the 
observable neighborhood characteristics typically assumed to serve as appropriate 
proxies for developer preferences. This is a problem because even a small amount of 
model misspecification can lead to biased estimates of program impact, particularly if the 
misspecification is tied to particularly influential variables (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 
2007). 
Previous evaluations of both NMTC (Freedman, 2012) and LIHTC (Baum-Snow 
& Marion, 2009) have circumvented this selection issue through the adoption of 
regression discontinuity (RD) designs. RD is a promising approach for evaluating 
programs like NMTC and LIHTC where eligibility is based on relatively strict and 
clearly defined thresholds. Given the extreme unlikelihood of nonrandom sorting of 
census tracts around either program’s poverty or income eligibility thresholds, there is a 
strong case to be made that the only systematic difference between the groups of census 
tracts falling just on either side of an eligibility threshold is eligibility status itself. Thus, 
any observed differences in the socioeconomic changes experienced by census tracts that 
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were barely eligible for NMTC or LIHTC, and those that were barely ineligible should be 
attributable to the effects of program treatment.  
The internal validity of a well-designed RD study approaches that of a true 
randomized experiment (Trochim & Donnelly, 2001). However, this strength comes at a 
price. First, RD only allows for estimating the effects of treatment on the entire group of 
eligible census tracts, rather than on those that actually received NMTC or LIHTC 
treatment. Second, valid comparisons can only be made between census tracts falling 
within a tight band on either side of the eligibility threshold. Consequently, the findings 
from a study of NMTC or LIHTC using RD are only generalizable to a small subset of 
moderately distressed eligible places, and cannot offer insight into the effects of program 
treatment on the much larger number of more severely distressed census tracts.   
If the underlying processes that drive NMTC and LIHTC site selection were 
better understood, comparison groups that more closely resemble targeted census tracts 
on all important pretreatment attributes could be identified. This would generate new 
opportunities for investigating the effects of NMTC and LIHTC on community 
conditions using quasiexperimental methods that avoid the inherent limitations of RD.  
To understand how NMTC and LIHTC site selection occurs, it is necessary to 
first understand the nature of the problem these and other place-based programs are 
designed to address. Thus, the first empirical chapter of the dissertation begins with a 
more fundamental question: what are the different types of low-income, high-poverty 
census tracts? Identifying the drivers of differentiation among the places eligible for 
NMTC and LIHTC may yield important clues about how site selection occurs through 
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these sorts of market-driven initiatives. Both NMTC and LIHTC site selection are 
assumed to be a function of multiple neighborhood- level considerations. Are the 
neighborhood factors that predict NMTC investment the same as those that predict 
LIHTC? Or, are the location decisions for each program made through independent and 
unrelated processes?  
 
2.5.2 Implications of NMTC and LIHTC parallels for evaluation 
The second problem haunting evaluations of these programs is the potential for 
estimates of program impact of one program to be biased by failing to account for the 
presence of the other program in the same or similar types of distressed census tracts. 
This omitted variable bias issue is closely related to the treatment selection issue 
discussed in the previous section, yet to my knowledge it has never been acknowledged 
or studied. It is important at this point to reiterate just how similar NMTC and LIHTC are 
to one another, in terms of overall policy structure and rules, the actors involved, and the 
mechanisms employed through which resources are delivered into low-income, high-
poverty census tracts.  
First, NMTC and LIHTC define important aspects of program eligibility based on 
similar thresholds of income and poverty. However, the basic requirements for NMTC 
eligibility are less strict than the corresponding thresholds used to determine whether a 
developer is eligible for a more generous level of tax credit through LIHTC; thus, every 
census tract that is eligible for NMTC is necessarily eligible for additional tax credits 
through LIHTC. There are also additional NMTC provisions that give preference to 
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eligible places that meet additional standards of distress. These high distress areas 
resemble the LIHTC requirements even more closely than the basic NMTC requirements. 
The overlapping tiers of NMTC and LIHTC eligibility would not be of concern 
from a causal validity standpoint if the processes that determined NMTC and LIHTC 
treatment selection were unrelated. This is unlikely, however, given that previous studies, 
which have only looked at NMTC and LIHTC individually, arrive at basically identical 
conclusions about the unobserved drivers of site selection. In both programs developers 
are assumed to seek out distressed areas that they perceive to be on an upward 
socioeconomic trajectory  
To summarize, the locational choices available to developers utilizing NMTC and 
LIHTC resources are bounded by program rules to closely overlapping sets of low-
income, high-poverty census tracts. Within this shared space, theory and limited 
empirical evidence suggests that NMTC and LIHTC development activity gravitates 
towards similar kinds of distressed places through unobserved processes related to the 
preferences of developers.  
The deep parallels linking NMTC and LIHTC are consequential for the 
development of valid research designs. The basic goal in a causal study of a program like 
NMTC or LIHTC is to draw comparisons between two groups of census tracts that, aside 
from one group having received the given program treatment, were identical in all other 
meaningful respects. This requirement is violated if the factors that determine a census 
tract’s probability of receiving NMTC treatment and LIHTC treatment are highly 
correlated.   
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While omitted variable bias is a concern whether the omitted variable pushes 
estimates of program impact up or down, the unresolved controversy surrounding the 
LIHTC provision that incentivizes developers to favor areas that are already 
disproportionately poor when considering potential locations for affordable housing 
creation adds an interesting layer to the complex relationship between NMTC and 
LIHTC. To the degree that LIHTC investment does concentrate poverty and drive the 
socioeconomic trajectories of targeted census tracts downwards, there is the distinct 
possibility that any evidence pointing to the effectiveness of NMTC as a tool for 
revitalizing distressed neighborhoods would be eroded, or even cancelled out, by the 
unaccounted-for presence of LIHTC in similar kinds of census tracts. By extension then, 
failing to account for the revitalizing effects of NMTC activity in an evaluation focused 
on LIHTC could result in an underestimation of the poverty-concentrating effects of 
LIHTC.   
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CHAPTER 3  
NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES AND PLACE-BASED INVESTMENT PATTERNS 
3.1 Introduction 
This is the first of two empirical chapters in this dissertation. In it I investigate the 
ways in which a poor neighborhood’s starting point explains its future socioeconomic 
trajectory, its likelihood of being targeted for different kinds of place-based investment, 
and the underlying relationship between these processes. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, scholars looking at NMTC and LIHTC suggest that, given the market-driven 
nature of these programs, development activity gravitates towards areas that are primed 
to experience socioeconomic ascent. Unfortunately, the links between the unobserved 
drivers of site selection and observable neighborhood characteristics that are plausibly 
related have not been thoroughly investigated for either NMTC or LIHTC. The 
uncertainty around NMTC and LIHTC treatment selection processes presents a 
methodological roadblock that has limited efforts to evaluate these programs. 
In general, the idea that developers and similar market actors seek out areas that 
they think will improve over time is uncontroversial. On the other hand, one of the 
strongest predictors of future poverty is past poverty (Peters, 2009). Thus, most of the 
census tracts that are eligible for NMTC or LIHTC investment at a given time will 
remain poor going forward. The justification for programs like NMTC and LIHTC, 
which restrict eligibility to benefit from public resources to subsets of high- income, low-
poverty census tracts, is that the market has failed to provide such places with adequate 
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access to the financial resources needed to support economic growth. How do developers 
discern between potential project locations when their options are limited almost entirely 
to places that (a) have been chronically ignored by market forces, and (b) are in most 
cases unlikely to experience significant ascent? 
Though most neighborhoods remain roughly the same over time, some are 
revitalized, and still others fall deeper into the vicious cycle of concentrated poverty. For 
the poor neighborhoods that do improve, what are the available and most likely pathways 
of ascent? From the developer perspective, are some ascending neighborhoods more 
attractive locations for place-based investment than others? Similarly, are there subsets of 
stable or declining poor neighborhoods that nevertheless appeal to developers for reasons 
unrelated to their socioeconomic trajectory?  
Finally, NMTC and LIHTC have never been examined together as they are in this 
study. Despite this, scholars looking at each program individually have arrived at similar 
conclusions about how observed investment patterns are produced. This is no surprise, 
given their numerous structural similarities as instruments for delivering resources into 
distressed census tracts. On the other hand, NMTC and LIHTC are still distinct programs 
that operate independently of one another. Furthermore, they focus on distinct types of 
development activity, and it may not be the case that the neighborhood factors most 
relevant to the economic and community development goals of NMTC are identical to 
the local considerations most important for the siting of affordable housing development 
through LIHTC. Are the locational patterns of NMTC investment and LIHTC investment 
explained by similar neighborhood-level considerations? Because patterns of investment, 
particularly in the context of developer preferences, have not been examined in detail for 
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either NMTC or LIHTC, it is difficult to speculate about whether, how, or to what degree 
NMTC and LIHTC site selection might be related.  
To explore these questions, I develop a typology of distressed metropolitan census 
tracts that, given levels of income and poverty in 2000, would have been eligible for 
NMTC, and in most cases eligible for additional tax credits through LIHTC, in the 
ensuing years. Typologies are an important tools in neighborhood research because they 
provide a framework for revealing the underlying structures and key features of complex 
urban landscapes. The goal here is to classify distressed census tracts in such a way that 
there are plausible theoretical and common-sense explanations for the links between the 
initial attributes and subsequent socioeconomic trajectories of each neighborhood type. 
These explanations can then serve as a reference point for better understanding the 
observed patterns of NMTC investment and LIHTC investment during the 2000s, given 
the argument that developers are motivated to seek out the poor neighborhoods most 
likely to follow an upward socioeconomic trajectory.   
3.2 Developing a Neighborhood Typology 
Starting with the pioneering Chicago school sociologists, urban scholars have 
been working to understand how cities are structured and how they change from an 
ecological perspective since the early 20th century. Thus, though there is no universal 
definition for what defines a neighborhood, there is broad agreement that neighborhoods 
are complex entities consisting of an intricately related mix of people, place, interactions, 
shared norms, and perceived or physical symbolic elements (Schwirian, 1983). 
Furthermore, neighborhoods exist within, and changes to them are largely driven by 
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enduring upstream economic, religious, political, cultural, and geographic contexts 
(Galea, Freudenberg, & Vlahov, 2006).  
Galster (2001) lays these foundational neighborhood elements out in more detail. 
He defines neighborhood as “the bundle of spatially based attributes associated with 
clusters of residences, sometimes in conjunction with other land uses,” and drawing from 
an expansive body of literature, identifies ten types of neighborhood attributes. 
Individually, each attribute type shines a light on one part of the larger neighborhood 
structure. Combined, they provide a comprehensive overall view of that structure. Once 
spatial boundaries are established, a neighborhood can be described in terms of: 
 The structural characteristics of the buildings 
 Infrastructure characteristics 
 Population demographics 
 Population class status 
 Public services and amenities associated with the tax base 
 Environmental characteristics, such as pollution and geographic features 
 Relative location of the neighborhood/proximity to employment and 
commercial areas 
 The strength and organization of the local political network 
 Social-interactive characteristics (e.g. social capital, cohesion) 
 Sentimental characteristics (e.g. place-attachment, residents’ self-
identification with neighborhood, historic buildings) 
 
The composition, quality, and presence of each attribute can vary widely from one 
neighborhood to the next. In this multi-dimensional context, every neighborhood is in a 
sense unique. However, it would be all but impossible, and potentially unhelpful, to 
incorporate elements of all ten neighborhood attributes into a single typology. Depending 
on the purpose of the classification, some attributes are more relevant than others for 
conceptualizing neighborhoods. For example, housing market typologies are an 
increasingly popular tool among policymakers for making strategic investment decisions 
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(Boswell, 2011; Goldstein, 2012; Reid, 2011). In many cases, housing market typologies 
classify neighborhoods according to features of the built environment alone, and do not 
include any indicators describing local populations (Boswell, 2011). In contrast, 
typologies that are more descriptive and exploratory in nature, such as several recent 
efforts to reveal the full extent of suburban diversity (Hanlon, 2009; Mikelbank, 2004; 
Orfield, 2011), take a more comprehensive and holistic tack by incorporating numerous 
indicators describing the population, the built environment, infrastructure, and location.  
Scholars looking at NMTC and LIHTC have for the most part been vague in 
identifying specific neighborhood attributes that developers are likely to pay attention to 
when making location decisions. Similarly, there are no a priori claims made in this study 
that any specific neighborhood attributes, either individually or in concert, bear particular 
relevance to a poor neighborhood’s socioeconomic trajectory. This chapter is motivated 
by the general hypothesis that a neighborhood’s socioeconomic trajectory is a function of 
its initial attributes, leaving open the possibility that the specific combination of attributes 
driving socioeconomic change may vary by neighborhood context. To minimize the risk 
of missing any key aspects of neighborhood change, it is therefore important in this study 
to conceptualize neighborhoods in as broad and comprehensive a manner as possible.  
Obtaining appropriate indicators to represent the types of neighborhood attributes 
identified by Galster is an unavoidable limiting factor for developing a comprehensive 
neighborhood typology. The availability and quality of relevant data points varies 
considerably by city, county, and metro area. However, in national studies, census data is 
the only viable source for relevant and universally available neighborhood indicators. 
Thus, neighborhoods are most commonly operationalized as census tracts in urban 
 
 
35 
 
research. The tract-level variables available through the census are most closely related to 
the following four types of neighborhood attributes: (a) the structural characteristics of 
the buildings, and more specifically local housing characteristics; (b) demographic 
characteristics of the resident population; (c) class status characteristics of the resident 
population; and (d) the relative location of the census tract within the metropolitan area.  
3.2.1 Proximity/relative location 
 The imbalance in living conditions in the city versus the suburbs is a fundamental 
source of tension that urban theory has long used to explain the organization of cities and 
the outward momentum of urban growth. For example, the invasion-succession 
hypothesis (Burgess, 2008) carries with it the implication that residential segregation 
along the lines of race, ethnicity, and class is a part of this tension, and is furthermore a 
relatively enduring feature of the urban landscape. However, it also assumes that minority 
groups, once sufficient economic progress has been made, do have the ability to upgrade 
their residential environment by relocating to more desirable areas. 
 This assumption broke down in the post-WWII years, as residential mobility for 
minority groups eroded due to a combination of improving transportation infrastructure, 
the corresponding spatial reorganization of employment areas that diminished the 
importance of living near the city center, and housing policies and practices that were 
often explicitly discriminatory.  
 In the last few decades, the nature of the relationship between poverty and place 
has continued to shift and evolve. Notably, the simple dichotomy of inner city 
deprivation and suburban prosperity has come under increased scrutiny. During the 
1990s, neighborhoods that experienced socioeconomic ascent were concentrated in the 
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inner cities and outermost suburbs of metropolitan areas (Kingsley, 2007). Unfortunately, 
the growing challenges facing older, inner-ring suburbs have been overshadowed by both 
the prosperity and rapid growth of newer suburban areas and the continuing problems in 
much of the inner city, leaving the first suburbs “caught in a policy blindspot (Puentes & 
Orfield, 2002).” Since 2000, the dispersion of neighborhood poverty throughout 
metropolitan areas has continued (P. A. Jargowsky, 2013).  
 Several recent typologies have worked to overcome the popular narrative of 
suburban stability and homogeneity by revealing the true diversity of suburbs. For 
example, Mikelbank applied hierarchical cluster analysis to a set of population, 
economic, and government variables (Mikelbank, 2004) on a sample of non-central-city 
metropolitan places, which revealed 10 distinct types of suburban cities. He found that 
fewer than half of suburban cities were classified into groups that possessed the attributes 
traditionally associated with suburbs. Narrowing the focus further, Hanlon discovered 
significant variation in the types of inner-ring suburbs in terms of race, class, and 
ethnicity (Hanlon, 2009).  
3.2.2 Population Demographics 
Taken at face value, the concept of neighborhood poverty implies only some 
degree of economic segregation. However, it is as much an issue of racial and ethnic 
isolation as one of class and economics. Though there is debate as to whether the 
persistent inequities in the life chances of minority populations trapped in low-quality 
residential environments are driven primarily by economic factors (Wilson, 1978) or are 
fundamentally rooted in racism (Massey & Denton, 1993), the importance of 
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incorporating aspects of race and ethnicity into a typology focused on neighborhood 
poverty would be difficult to understate.  
Despite the association of economic and racial segregation as nearly synonymous 
issues, there is in reality wide variation in the demographic composition of poor 
neighborhoods. Though still disproportionately affecting minority populations, since 
2000, the number of poor whites living in high poverty neighborhoods has increased 
more than any other group (P. A. Jargowsky, 2013). More generally, in any metropolitan 
area there are bound to be pockets of poverty in which different populations are most 
prominent. There is likely to be a strong degree of regional variation in the kinds of poor 
neighborhoods that exist along the lines of race and ethnicity (Delmelle, 2017).  
Recent research on gentrification suggests that the demographic profile of a poor 
neighborhood may affect its chances of undergoing socioeconomic ascent. Specifically, 
the presence of Asians in a poor neighborhood has been found to be positively associated 
with gentrification (Hwang, 2016), while black and Hispanic neighborhoods are more 
likely to experience socioeconomic stability or decline (Hwang & Sampson, 2014).  
3.2.3 Population Class Status 
 While almost all neighborhoods have some degree of poverty, determining the 
point at which the struggles of poor residents become a feature of the neighborhood itself 
is not straightforward. The Census Bureau defines poverty areas as census tracts with 
greater than 20 percent poverty ("Poverty Areas," 1995). Though many studies of 
neighborhood poverty follow this official definition, others have operationalized 
neighborhood poverty at 30 percent (Cortright & Mahmoudi, 2014), while Jargowsky and 
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Bane found, after touring neighborhoods with various poverty rates throughout the US, 
that a 40 percent threshold may more closely reflect the tipping point beyond which the 
concentration effects of poverty become visible neighborhood features (1991). Still 
others have proposed multidimensional indices of neighborhood distress that incorporate 
indicators of the urban underclass in addition to poverty status (Kasarda, 1993; Ricketts 
& Sawhill, 1988).  
The various thresholds chosen in past studies illustrate that there are gradients of 
neighborhood poverty and distress. Though some scholars have focused on neighborhood 
poverty within a relatively narrow range, more often, all places that meet some minimum 
requirement are included in the analysis. This approach is bound to cast a wide net, 
capturing places contending with vastly different levels of deprivation. The class-related 
characteristics of the resident population have implications for a neighborhood’s 
socioeconomic trajectory. For example, the process of externally-driven gentrification is 
a rare occurrence in deeply impoverished neighborhoods (Clay, 1979; Helms, 2003). 
Similarly, ascent through incumbent upgrading is most likely in relatively stable, 
moderate-income areas (Clay, 1979; Owens, 2012; Van Criekingen & Decroly, 2003). 
Local income levels also relate to the organizational capacity of the local population in 
terms of the ability to effectively communicate local needs to government leaders and 
other decision-makers (Jun & Musso, 2013).  
3.2.4 Housing Characteristics 
The qualities of the local housing stock can reveal much about a neighborhood, 
including its function within the metropolitan ecosystem, its needs and assets, its 
residential population, and its propensity to experience different trajectories of 
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socioeconomic change. For instance, the type of housing that predominates- single family 
homes versus townhomes, apartments, and other multi-unit structures, provides a rough 
indicator of where a neighborhood lies along the urban-rural continuum. Owner-occupied 
housing relates to neighborhood stability, as residential turnover is generally less frequent 
for homeowners versus renters (Coulton, 2014). It may also lend insight into the physical 
condition of the housing stock, as owner-occupied housing tends to receive more regular 
and substantive upkeep than rental housing (Rohe & Stewart, 1996). 
In many cities, local housing market conditions may also play a part in 
determining the kinds of policy interventions that are applied to a poor neighborhood, or 
even whether a neighborhood is likely to be targeted for public investment at all. Given 
the reality of limited resources available to address often widespread problems, local 
governments have in recent years looked to housing market typologies to make strategic 
decisions for targeting investments into certain areas (Boswell, 2011). The indicators 
selected to represent local housing markets vary from city to city. In some cases, 
variables relating to population characteristics are used alongside housing variables, 
while other cities focus only on facets of the built environment and household structure 
(Baltimore City's 2014 Housing Market Typology, 2015; Goldstein, 2011; Reid, 2011).  
3.3 Study Area 
The primary study area consists of census tracts that met at least one of the basic 
NMTC eligibility requirements in 2000: (a) tract MFI less than 80 percent of metro/state 
MFI; or (b) poverty rate above 20 percent. Any census tract that met one of these 
requirements but not the other was only included in the study if it was more distressed 
than the metropolitan average on the non-qualifying indicator. Thus, a relatively small 
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number of “high poverty-high income” and “low poverty-low income” census tracts were 
excluded even though they were technically sufficiently poor to qualify for NMTC, and 
potentially for additional tax credits through LIHTC as well. They were excluded because 
further investigation revealed that these places tended to be poor for reasons that have 
little to do with the purpose of programs like NMTC and LIHTC, and in ways that set 
them apart from most distressed places. To illustrate, high-poverty census tracts (>20%) 
in which the MFI was greater than the MFI of the surrounding metro area were almost 
exclusively located in well-known college towns (e.g. Ann Arbor), suggesting areas with 
high concentrations of student housing. Though recent research suggests that poverty, 
food insecurity, and homelessness are hidden and underreported problems on many 
college campuses (Goldrick-Rab, Richardson, & Hernandez, 2017), in general, poverty 
for college students is a planned situation with predefined start- and end-dates. 
Furthermore, the annual housing churn that occurs as incoming freshmen replace 
graduating seniors means that poverty rates in neighborhoods with lots of student housing 
are stable and enduring neighborhood features. In other words, the flavor of poverty in 
these areas, both at the individual- and neighborhood-level is very different than the 
structural disadvantages of socioeconomic isolation found in most poor places.  
Census tracts with zero or near zero populations, as well as those that had missing 
values for any of the variables needed to construct the outcome measures were also 
excluded. Finally, only metropolitan areas that received investment through either NMTC 
or LIHTC during the treatment period for this study of 2003-2007 were considered. What 
remained after these exclusions were 14,750 census tracts located within 276 
metropolitan areas.  
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The basic NMTC poverty and income requirements, which are less strict than the 
corresponding LIHTC thresholds for receiving more generous tax incentives, served as 
the starting point for identifying the study population. The reasoning for taking this 
relatively relaxed approach to operationalizing neighborhood poverty was that it would 
allow for an investigation of place-based investment across the full spectrum of places 
typically targeted by these types of programs, from the moderately distressed to the 
extremely impoverished.   
However, after working with the data for a time, it became clear that this 
definition may have been too broad with respect to properly investigating the role of the 
market actors that use NMTC and LIHTC financing, and specifically their presumed 
preference for places they believe will experience future socioeconomic ascent, in 
shaping NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns. Though every census tract included in 
the primary analysis was eligible for NMTC and LIHTC investment during the 2000s, 
both programs include provisions favoring census tracts that meet higher criteria of 
socioeconomic distress than the basic program eligibility requirements dictate. First, as 
just mentioned, LIHTC requirements for additional tax credits are stricter than the basic 
NMTC requirements on both the MFI ratio (80 percent for NMTC versus 60 percent for 
LIHTC) and poverty rate (20 percent for NMTC versus 25 percent for LIHTC) 
thresholds. Thus, Second, CDEs are more likely to be awarded NMTC allocation 
authority if they indicate on the program application that at least 75 percent of allocations 
will go to projects located in eligible census tracts that meet additional requirements 
(MFI ratio of 60 percent; poverty rate above 30 percent; or unemployment 1.5 times the 
metropolitan average).  
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These provisions effectively divide the study population into multiple tiers of 
eligibility or favorability. If a developer wants to locate a subsidized project into a census 
tract that is only moderately distressed, they must weigh this preference against the 
additional benefits they may be able to receive if they instead select a more severely 
distressed area. In contrast, in more severely distressed census tracts for which all 
additional rules and provisions have been satisfied, no such competing motivations exist. 
Thus, the observed locational patterns of NMTC and LIHTC investment in these areas 
may be a more pure reflection of the preference structures of developers for 
neighborhoods with certain attributes, rather than other factors affecting site selection.  
Thus, I determined that it was important to also investigate the locational patterns 
of NMTC and LIHTC investment in a subset of “severely distressed” census tracts in 
which there were no obvious drivers of site selection other than the preferences of 
developers. For the purpose of this study, a census tract was considered to be severely 
distressed if it met both of the following conditions: (a) poverty rate above 25 percent, 
and (b) MFI ratio less than 60 percent. All 5,161 census tracts that met both requirements 
would have been given the full consideration and benefit of both programs during the 
2000s. Descriptive statistics for the primary study population and for the subset of 
severely distressed census tracts are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Census Tract Characteristics 
  
 All tracts (n = 14750) 
severely distressed tracts (n = 
5161) 
Year 2000 Attributes (% unless noted)  
Poverty Rate 25.86 35.99 
MFI Ratio (tract/metro income) 59.57 44.85 
Unemployment 10.91 14.92 
White 35.74 19.20 
Black 31.45 45.93 
Hispanic 26.66 29.56 
Asian 4.41 3.78 
Foreign-born 19.28 19.76 
High school or less 63.77 70.46 
Bachelors or more 13.05 9.41 
Vacancy rate 9.37 11.31 
Housing owner-occupied 43.85 33.53 
Pop.density (mi2) 11567 14928 
Density ratio (tract/metro) 165 194 
Housing in multi-unit structure 45.03 53.31 
tract/metro home prices 66.03 57.96 
2000 to 2009-2013 SES change (percentage point, 
except for median home value change)  
poverty.ch 4.47 2.75 
mfi.ch -2576 -968 
mfi.ratio.ch -0.75 0.89 
unemp.ch 4.58 3.92 
mhmval.ch $44,023 $50,128 
Investment from 2003-2007  
NMTC $5,873,617,231 $3,379,389,616 
LIHTC $1,293,313,586 $734,952,443 
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3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Neighborhood Variables 
Variables describing the initial attributes of census tracts came from the 2000 
Decennial Census. Variable selection was made with respect to two principal concerns. It 
was important to include variables relating to the four neighborhood attributes discussed 
earlier- population demographics, population class status, housing characteristics, and 
location characteristics- while simultaneously ensuring that the selected variables as a 
group met the minimum established guidelines and rules of thumb for the methods 
employed to develop the typology. In particular, the success of factor analysis at reducing 
a set of observed variables into a smaller number of meaningful and theoretically relevant 
combined variables depends on how the included variables are related. In general, the 
aim is to strike a balance between uniqueness and multicollinearity. After 
experimentation with numerous alternative specifications, the thirteen variables listed in 
Table 2 were selected to represent neighborhoods.  
 
Table 2. Variables Used to Identify Neighborhood Dimensions 
Variable Name Description 
Demographic   
black.pct.00 Percent Black 
other.race.pct.00 Percent neither non-Hispanic black nor white 
hh_female_kids.pct.00 Percent  Female-headed Households 
Class Status   
poverty.pct.00 Poverty Rate (%) 
mfi.ratio.00 MFI Ratio (tract/metro income) 
unemp.pct.00 Unemployment Rate (%) 
female_labor.pct.00 Percent of Females 16 and Over in Labor Force 
hs.edu.pct.00 Percent of Adults Over 24 with HS Education or Less 
Housing  
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vac.pct.00 Percent of Housing Units Vacant 
multi.pct.00 Percent of Housing Units in Multi-unit Structures 
own.pct.00 Percent of Housing Owner-occupied 
mhmval.00 Median Home Value 
Proximity  
density.00.ratio Ratio of density in census tract to metro  
 
Most of the indicators used here have found use in previous neighborhood 
typologies and are generally self-explanatory. Still, a couple comments are necessary. 
First, the location and proximity characteristics of census tracts are operationalized as the 
ratio of population density in the census tract to the surrounding metro area. The census 
tracts included in this study come from a wide range of metropolitan contexts in terms of 
size and urbanization. This relative measure makes it possible to draw parallels between 
census tracts that may bear very little surface resemblance, but that occupy the same 
ecological niche within their respective metropolitan settings. This measure may also do 
a better job of reflecting proximity characteristics in polycentric urban areas than would a 
measure that assumes a single central business district, such as distance from downtown.  
Second, the percent of females in the labor force was included as an indicator of 
population class status. It was chosen instead of labor force participation for the entire 
adult population because from the earliest stages of social area analysis, female labor 
force participation has been considered an important aspect of family structure, which is 
one of the fundamental dimensions of social organization in neighborhoods (Greer, 1962; 
Schwirian, 1983).  
 Four socioeconomic change indicators were constructed using the 2000 census 
data and the 2009-2013 American Community Survey (ACS). The outcomes examined in 
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this study are the 2000 to 2009-2013 differences in poverty rate, unemployment rate, 
median family income, and median home value. The poverty and unemployment 
measures are percentage point changes. Median family income and median home values 
measures are inflation-adjusted dollar changes. Together, these four measures provide a 
well-rounded picture of the socioeconomic trajectory of a census tract during the 2000s. 
3.4.2 Program Variables  
NMTC and LIHTC data came from each program’s respective public data release. 
The CDFI Fund, which administers NMTC, requires all CDEs that are awarded an 
NMTC allocation to submit an annual report describing how the allocation was used 
(Fund, 2017b). Although LIHTC is administered by the IRS, data on LIHTC investment 
activity is maintained by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014). 
The variables describing NMTC and LIHTC investment most relevant to this 
study are allocation year, the census tract in which the investment occurred, and the 
dollar amount of the investment. In this chapter, both NMTC investment and LIHTC 
investment are defined in simple binary terms: a census tract is considered to have 
received NMTC or LIHTC if there was at least one recorded instance of investment from 
2003 to 2007. Three treatment variables were created to indicate whether a census tract 
received both NMTC and LIHTC, NMTC (irrespective of LIHTC investment, and 
LIHTC (irrespective of NMTC).  
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3.5 Method 
The approach to typology development applied in this study is well-established in 
the history of urban research (Shevky & Bell, 1955), and finds continued use today 
(Hanlon, 2009; Owens, 2012). It is a two-step process. First, the thirteen neighborhood 
attribute variables shown in Table 2 were entered into a principal components analysis 
(PCA) to uncover key neighborhood dimensions. Second, cluster analysis was used to 
delineate distinct subgroups of census tracts based on similar combinations of values 
along those dimensions.  
3.5.1 Principal Components Analysis 
A commonly used factor extraction technique in exploratory studies (Pett, 
Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003), PCA was used to uncover the latent drivers of differentiation 
among poor census tracts. PCA converts the correlation matrix of a set of variables into 
uncorrelated linear combinations of those variables, referred to as components. The 
variables with higher loadings on a component explain more of the variance within that 
component. The basic idea behind PCA is that the set of variables that load highly against 
a component may each be describing different facets of some common underlying 
construct (Field, 2009). In terms of the current study, if the subgroup of observed 
neighborhood indicators that are strongly associated with a particular component fit 
together in a theoretical sense, then the relationships between these variables may be 
pointing towards some unobserved, but meaningful neighborhood dimension.  
The R package psych was used to conduct the PCA. The output of the procedure 
includes standardized component scores for each census tract on the retained 
components. A component score is a weighted average of the variables that make up a 
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component; in effect, it is an index of the neighborhood dimension that component 
represents. Thus, a census tract’s component scores describe the nature and strength of its 
association with the neighborhood dimensions identified by the PCA.  
3.5.2 Cluster analysis 
 Cluster analysis is a computationally intensive procedure, which can be a problem 
when the goal is to classify a large number of observations. The benefit of PCA in this 
study is that it summarizes thirteen theoretically relevant neighborhood indicators in a 
few combined variables. By conducting cluster analysis on these combined variables, 
much more information about poor neighborhoods can be taken into consideration for 
identifying neighborhood types than would be possible if individual observed variables 
were used instead.  
The two most common clustering techniques for neighborhood classification in 
previous studies are hierarchical clustering and clustering through partitioning (e.g., k-
means). For example, Mikelbank (2004) used a hierarchical approach to classify the types 
of suburban places, while Owens (2012) used k-means clustering to examine the various 
pathways of socioeconomic ascent for different types of census tracts. Both hierarchical 
and k-means clustering have been subject to criticism for their reliance on heuristics to 
determine the number and orientation of clusters (Fraley & Raftery, 1998). In this study, 
a model-based technique was used that incorporates elements of both methods, but takes 
such decisions out of the hands of user. Instead, the data itself is allowed determine the 
number and orientation of clusters, as well as the best cluster solution.  
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The R package mclust was used to perform the cluster analysis (Fraley & Raftery, 
2006). Mclust requires the user to specify a range of possible cluster solutions that should 
be considered. Starting with the highest number in the specified range, mclust runs 14 
different clustering algorithms, each of which produces clusters with a different 
combination of geometric attributes in terms of their shape, volume, and orientation.  
The program then calculates the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for each 
alternative cluster solution. The BIC is a model selection tool based on the maximum-
likelihood function. Given that the best fitting model is, by definition, the one that places 
each observation into its own cluster, maximum-likelihood prefers solutions with more 
clusters. The BIC applies a penalty term to the likelihood to reduce the risk of selecting 
overly-complex cluster solutions. In general, the best cluster solution is the one with the 
lowest BIC. In the current study, the 14 clustering algorithms were run for between one 
and fifteen clusters. Thus, the procedure generated approximately 210 distinct 
neighborhood classifications, from which the one with the lowest BIC could be selected. 
The key features and theoretical underpinning of the neighborhood types identified by the 
preferred cluster solution were then investigated.  
3.5.3 Patterns of investment and SES change by neighborhood type 
 The study then shifts focus to explore the relationships between NMTC 
investment, LIHTC investment, and socioeconomic change within and across 
neighborhood types. The measures of NMTC investment, LIHTC investment, and 
socioeconomic change described earlier were aggregated for each neighborhood type. 
Place-based investment intensity was operationalized through three variables: the percent 
of census tracts in each neighborhood type that between 2003 and 2007 received 
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investment through (a) NMTC (regardless of LIHTC investment), (b) LIHTC (regardless 
of NMTC investment), and (c) both NMTC and LIHTC. Four aggregate measures of 
socioeconomic change were calculated as well. These were the average of 2000 to 2009-
2013 change in (a) MFI, (b) poverty rate, (d) unemployment rate, and (e) median home 
value.  
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Uncovering Neighborhood Dimensions  
As mentioned above, the thirteen variables chosen to represent census tracts’ 
initial attributes were selected with respect to their theoretical relevance as well as their 
ability as a group to satisfy the established guidelines for conducting PCA (Field, 2009). 
The Kaiser-Meyer Olkin test verified the sampling adequacy of the data, with a value of 
.74, indicating the suitability of the data as ‘good’ for conducting PCA. Furthermore, the 
minimum KMO value for any of the variables was .64, well above the minimum 
suggested value of .5. Bartlett’s test of sphericity found that there was sufficient 
correlation between all variables to conduct a PCA, while the determinant of the 
correlation matrix, at .00067, was well above the minimum value of .000001, ruling out 
concern over multicollinearity.  
A common rule of thumb is to retain all components with eigenvalues greater than 
one, as they have at least as much explanatory power as one of the observed variables. 
Initial analysis of the data revealed eight components that met this criterion. However, 
the inflection point on the scree plot in Figure 3 supported retention of only the first three 
components, as each subsequent component explained relatively little additional model 
variance. To determine whether eight components, three components, or some number in 
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between provided the most theoretically coherent explanation of the data, several models 
were run, in which different numbers of components were retained. The oblique rotation 
oblimin, which allows the rotated components to be correlated, was applied.  
 
Figure 3: Scree Plot of Component Eigenvalues 
 
 
The solution retaining three components was determined to provide the best 
representation of key neighborhood dimensions. Additional components either loaded 
highly on a single variable, or drew relatively weak connections between two or more 
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variables with no obvious interpretation as meaningful neighborhood dimensions. The 
three retained components together explained 66 percent of the variance of the original 
variables. With eigenvalues ranging from 2.82 to 2.89, each of the combined variables 
had nearly the same explanatory power as three of the original variables. Table 3 shows 
the loading of each variable on the retained components.  
 
Table 3. Component Loadings 
    
 TC1 TC2 TC3 
hs.pct.00 0.84 -0.31 -0.08 
female_labor.pct.00 -0.78 0.14 0.24 
poverty.pct.00 0.62 0.34 0.31 
mfi.ratio.00 -0.59 -0.44 -0.3 
unemp.pct.00 0.56 0.18 0.36 
own.pct.00 -0.02 -0.94 0.02 
homes_multi_unit.pct.00 -0.14 0.91 -0.07 
density.00.ratio -0.07 0.57 0.02 
mhmval.00.ratio -0.39 0.42 -0.32 
black.pct.00 0.02 -0.05 0.89 
other.race.00 0.45 0.21 -0.8 
hh_female_kids.pct.00 0.24 0.22 0.79 
homes_vacant.pct.00 0.18 -0.22 0.52 
 
 
The first neighborhood dimension is primarily an index of population class status 
and neighborhood distress. It considers the local population’s economic strengths and 
vulnerabilities in shaping the overall wellbeing of the neighborhood. It indicates that 
poorly educated populations are disconnected from the local labor market, and 
furthermore that these issues of human capital and social organization are associated with 
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low levels of neighborhood economic wellbeing, in terms of poverty, income, and 
employment. Interestingly, other.race.00, representing the percentage of the population 
that is neither non-Hispanic black nor non-Hispanic white, also loads against this 
component in a positive direction, indicating that this neighborhood dimension may in 
part describe resident socioeconomic distress in poor neighborhoods for reasons unrelated 
to the well-documented discrimination and isolation of the African American community. 
Regardless of the demographic composition of the resident population, census tracts with 
higher values on this dimension are likely to be struggling with more severe 
socioeconomic distress than the average poor census tract.  
The second neighborhood dimension is an urbanization index. It describes the 
degree to which the composition of the housing stock resembles the typical high-density 
urban neighborhood where most families rent and much of the housing stock consists of 
apartments and other multi-unit structures. It also describes the population density of a 
census tract relative to the metropolitan area in which it is situated. Thus, one would 
expect the census tracts with the highest positive values on this dimension to be located 
in the urban core, while those with high negative values to occupy the metropolitan 
fringe.  
The third neighborhood dimension describes the demographic characteristics of 
the resident population. Specifically though, it is an index of black socioeconomic 
isolation, as indicated by the opposite loadings for black.pct.00 and other.race.00. 
Although the percent white variable was not included in the PCA, preliminary analysis 
suggests that if it had been, it would have contrasted with black.pct.00 in much the same 
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way. It represents the ugly reality that concentrated poverty is a problem that continues to 
disproportionately affect the African American community. Compounding the 
geographic isolation of poor black populations are high rates of home vacancy and a high 
percentage of single-parent households headed by females.   
 The results of the PCA were encouraging, as the three retained components 
appear to represent meaningful neighborhood dimensions. Furthermore, each component 
corresponds to one of the neighborhood attribute types described by Galster, which 
served as the guide for variable selection in this study. The first dimension is most 
strongly associated with the five class status variables. In addition to three of the four 
housing variables, the second dimension is also described by the relative population 
density variable, which was used to represent proximity characteristics. The dimension of 
black socioeconomic isolation includes the three demographic indicators plus one 
variable describing the qualities of the local housing stock.  
 
3.6.2 Neighborhood Classification 
 The BIC values of the alternative clustering algorithms for solutions from one to 
fifteen clusters are displayed in Figure 4. The procedure found that a ten-cluster solution 
based on an algorithm producing ellipsoidal clusters of varying shape, volume, and 
orientation (VVV) produced the best model fit.  
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Figure 4: Bayesian Information Criterion Values for Alternative Cluster Solutions 
 
 
On the other hand, the authors of the mclust package, who also developed the 
model-based approach to clustering it employs, suggest that a parameterization with 
fewer clusters may be preferable to the solution with the absolute highest BIC if it forms 
a decisive local maximum (Fraley & Raftery, 1998). While the VVV algorithm forms 
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both a local and global maximum at ten clusters, the amount of additional information 
gained from adding more clusters drops off sharply beyond five clusters, relative to the 
cost of additional model complexity. Thus, it was necessary to further examine the 
content of the alternative model specifications to determine which cluster solution 
provided the best representation of the types of poor neighborhoods.  
While the preliminary analysis of the alternative model specifications is not 
presented here, in the end I selected the ten-cluster solution. A couple considerations 
motivated this decision. First, I found that the degree and manner in which NMTC 
investment, LIHTC investment, and socioeconomic change related to one another within 
and across neighborhood types was quite consistent as additional clusters were added, up 
to and including the ten-cluster solution. The nature of these enduring linkages is 
discussed in depth later in this chapter. 
Second, whereas the five-cluster solution grouped census tracts into relatively 
broad neighborhood archetypes, the more complex specification allowed for a more 
nuanced examination of underlying relationships between socioeconomic change and 
place-based investment patterns. To illustrate, the ten-cluster solution identified multiple 
neighborhood types that experienced socioeconomic ascent from 2000 to 2009-2013. 
While gentrification commonly serves as a blanket term to describe positive economic 
gains in poor neighborhoods, scholars recognize it is just one potential pathway of 
socioeconomic ascent. Other pathways of ascent, notably marginal gentrification, 
upgrading, and incumbent upgrading, may be partially or entirely distinct from traditional 
notions of gentrification (Owens, 2012; Van Criekingen & Decroly, 2003). It is also 
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recognized that conditions can deteriorate in a neighborhood for more than one reason. 
Though socioeconomic trajectories leading to little change over time have received less 
attention, it stands to reason that there are multiple pathways of stability as well. 
Comparing the intensity of NMTC and LIHTC activity in poor neighborhoods that were 
characterized by different combinations of attributes in 2000, but that followed similar 
socioeconomic trajectories over the course of the 2000s, may allow for a more detailed 
understanding of the underlying neighborhood- level drivers of place-based investment.  
 Table 4 provides the group means for the initial attributes and socioeconomic 
changes of each cluster, as well as the percentage of census tracts in each cluster that 
received investment through NMTC, LIHTC, or both programs. Though the 
neighborhood types identified by cluster analysis have no inherent order, I organized 
them in ascending order of relative population density. 
  
5
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Table 4. Census Tract Characteristics 
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
n 1073 1259 469 2688 1770 2520 1420 1588 1361 602 
Year 2000 attributes (% unless noted)           
Total population (mil) 4.1 5.7 1.7 10.9 5.9 9.5 4.5 6.2 5.8 2.2 
Poverty rate 17.38 25.74 23.95 17.64 29.36 24.07 37.21 37.09 24.74 22.67 
MFI ratio (tract/metro) 73.65 64.65 61.61 71.47 54.37 60.56 43.37 43.46 55.05 71.22 
Unemployment 6.86 11.22 10.15 7.02 14.23 9.67 17.18 16.01 9.43 5.97 
White 71.52 13.52 48.80 57.21 10.22 44.09 14.23 21.50 25.56 63.85 
Black 12.24 2.98 37.37 12.77 86.46 32.02 76.87 24.18 4.56 12.66 
Hispanic 12.69 78.00 10.73 22.58 2.31 18.05 6.69 46.97 54.53 13.02 
Asian 1.09 4.10 1.71 5.33 0.47 3.89 1.40 4.90 13.29 8.38 
Recent immigrants 2.72 14.73 3.97 8.58 1.02 8.16 3.79 13.29 25.25 10.89 
Foreign-born 6.47 37.74 8.29 17.40 2.29 16.01 7.73 27.29 51.25 17.86 
High school diploma or less 67.10 77.21 69.26 56.31 66.80 58.75 67.24 74.24 66.12 29.65 
Bachelors or more 9.12 6.01 8.37 15.99 8.51 15.67 10.01 7.64 15.76 43.11 
Females in labor force 50.67 44.94 52.05 56.89 52.81 55.93 52.48 44.80 48.06 66.61 
Work in management position 20.69 14.81 18.01 24.65 18.69 23.54 20.10 16.22 21.77 42.11 
Vacancy rate 11.53 5.80 11.15 6.74 13.69 10.00 14.13 9.83 4.57 6.32 
Housing owner-occupied 76.39 58.94 58.23 50.05 56.12 39.04 29.06 27.59 23.95 22.24 
Population density (mi2) 1185 7311 4277 6630 6380 10087 12420 20642 32941 13863 
Pop. density ratio (tract/metro)  36.05 117.59 121.33 141.36 158.42 182.30 198.85 205.03 225.85 262.72 
Homes in multi-unit structures 6.81 19.16 21.59 40.32 23.96 52.99 62.32 61.59 77.70 76.80 
Home value ratio (tract/metro) 0.61 0.64 0.54 0.72 0.47 0.67 0.58 0.60 0.86 1.02 
2000 to 2009-2013 SES change           
Poverty (percentage point) 4.14 2.64 7.16 5.72 6.65 6.10 3.41 1.89 1.27 4.49 
  
5
9 
Table 4 (continued)           
MFI ($) -2390 -3094 -5691 -4219 -6025 -3185 -793 -771 -126 6126 
MFI ratio 1.18 -1.22 -4.44 -2.42 -4.42 -1.70 1.30 0.36 0.72 10.82 
Unemployment (percentage point) 6.31 2.45 6.89 5.40 8.18 4.99 4.46 1.32 2.04 2.88 
Median home value ($) 13031 35449 12827 35185 7637 38185 46302 60936 131832 63865 
2003-2007 investment            
NMTC and LIHTC 0.19 0.48 0.43 0.63 0.34 1.23 1.48 2.46 1.10 1.16 
NMTC 2.14 3.42 3.84 3.46 3.73 6.23 7.39 9.26 5.22 6.31 
LIHTC 3.63 9.21 8.32 8.33 10.34 10.83 17.04 17.00 7.94 7.64 
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3.6.3 Types of Poor Neighborhoods 
This section discusses the initial attributes, subsequent socioeconomic trajectories, 
and the intensity of place-based investment for each neighborhood type. Also provided 
are a series of tables and maps. The tables show the ten large metro areas that had the 
highest percentage of poor census tracts of each type in 20001. The maps show the 
distribution of each neighborhood type in metropolitan Atlanta, which was one of seven 
metro areas that had at least one census tract from each neighborhood type.   
                                                                 
1 Though this study includes census tracts from 276 metropolitan areas, these rankings only consider the 
50 largest metro areas by population in 2000. Many of the smaller metro areas had only one or two 
census tracts in the analysis; thus, they tended to dominate the rankings for each neighborhood type, 
without providing any useful insight about neighborhood type.  
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3.6.3.1 Cluster 1: stable white exurbs 
 
Figure 5: Cluster 1 Map 
 
 
Cluster 1 represents poverty in the semi-rural metropolitan outskirts. This is the 
only cluster made up of tracts that were less densely populated than their surrounding 
metro areas. Not surprisingly then, the housing stock was dominated by owner-occupied, 
single-family homes. This cluster also had highest percentage of white residents, and was 
the least distressed of all the clusters in 2000, in terms of both poverty rate and MFI ratio.   
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Socioeconomic outcomes in Cluster 1 were mixed. Cluster 1 experienced weak 
housing appreciation and above average increases in poverty, relative to poor census 
tracts overall. Though all but one of the neighborhood types saw inflation-adjusted 
income decrease over the course of the 2000s, the $2,390 drop in MFI for Cluster 1 was 
slightly worse than the average for all neighborhood types. On the other hand, the 
positive value on mfi.ratio.ch indicates that the within-metro rank of Cluster 1 tracts 
actually improved over the same period. A likely explanation for the contrast of worse-
than-average absolute income change but better-than-average relative income change is 
that Cluster 1 is populated by tracts located in metro areas that were especially hard-hit 
by the economic recession of the late-2000s.  
The relatively low levels of socioeconomic distress in 2000 might lead one to 
suspect that this neighborhood type would have been attractive to risk-averse developers. 
Instead, it saw the lowest levels of both NMTC and LIHTC investment from 2001-2007. 
Furthermore, this is only neighborhood type in which not a single census tract was 
targeted by both programs.  
 
Table 5: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 1 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
Tulsa, OK 43.53 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 34.04 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 30.94 
Pittsburgh, PA 22.78 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--
Franklin, TN 21.35 
Austin-Round Rock, TX 17.24 
Tucson, AZ 16.46 
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Oklahoma City, OK 15.00 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 13.07 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 12.63 
 
 
3.6.3.2 Cluster 2: Hispanic immigrant gateways 
 
Figure 6: Cluster 2 Map 
 
 Cluster 2 census tracts are heavily concentrated in metropolitan areas adjacent to 
the Mexican border in California and Texas, and in California’s agricultural heartland. 
This cluster is notable for the overall absence of both white and black non-Hispanic 
 
 
64 
 
residents, and the dominance of Hispanics, recent immigrants, and foreign-born residents. 
The residents of these neighborhoods have among the lowest levels of educational 
attainment, workforce participation, and employment in high-status (management) jobs. 
Thus, the neighborhood dimension describing high levels of economic distress and low 
levels of human capital is a defining feature of Cluster 2.  
Taken together, these attributes suggest the interpretation of this cluster as a 
distinct type of immigrant neighborhood. Specifically, these places serve as the initial 
landing points for large numbers of economic migrants arriving to the United States from 
Mexico and Central America, many of whom may be undocumented (Hill & Johnson, 
2011).  
From 2000 to 2009-2013, this cluster remained relatively stable. On two of the 
socioeconomic indicators- poverty change and unemployment change, the tracts in this 
cluster fared better than average. On the other hand, home value appreciation was 
somewhat slower, and MFI declined, both in absolute terms and relative to MFI change 
in their respective metro areas.  
While place-based investment was somewhat more frequent in this Cluster 2 than 
in Cluster 1, the percentage of census tracts receiving investment for both NMTC and 
LIHTC was well below average.  
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Table 6: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 2 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 88.00 
El Paso, TX 77.01 
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 49.13 
Fresno, CA 34.00 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 26.84 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 22.12 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 22.11 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 20.58 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 16.99 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 16.71 
 
3.6.3.3 Cluster 3: racially heterogeneous neighborhoods  
 
Figure 7: Cluster 3 Map 
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Cluster 3 was the least common neighborhood type, representing only 3.2 percent 
of the census tracts included in the study. It is also somewhat difficult to concisely define, 
as its baseline attributes do not immediately evoke the image of a specific kind of poor 
place that exists empirically, theoretically, or in the public consciousness. However, the 
map provides some important context. It shows that only one of the Cluster 3 tracts in 
metropolitan Atlanta was located within Atlanta city limits. The rest tended to be located 
in the county seats of the counties making up the periphery of the metro region (e.g. 
Conyers, Covington, and Griffin, GA). Thus, whereas Cluster 1 represented semi-rural 
neighborhood poverty, Cluster 3 may represent small-town neighborhood poverty.  
Cluster 3 had the second lowest population density; however, these tracts were 
still somewhat denser than their respective metro areas, which indicates that they tended 
to be situated in relatively small metro areas that were not highly urbanized. The housing 
markets in these places were quite weak in 2000, with home values barely half the metro 
averages and above average vacancy rates.  
The demographic profile of this cluster finds that these neighborhoods were home 
to a relatively even mix of black and white residents who were born in the United States. 
This is only one of three clusters that was not majority black, white, or Hispanic. Very 
few of the residents are Hispanic, Asian, or foreign born. Moreover, the population is 
poorly educated, with an above-average percentage of adults with a high school degree or 
less, and very few residents with at least a bachelor’s degree.  
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The most notable facet of Cluster 3 is that it suffered significant socioeconomic 
decline over the course of the 2000s. Cluster 3 was either the worst or second worst 
performer on all five indicators of socioeconomic change. Place-based investment played 
little part in mitigating the economic freefall Cluster 3 experienced, as the intensity of 
investment was below average for both NMTC and LIHTC.   
Table 7: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 3 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC 17.07 
Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN 10.31 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 9.09 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-
DE-MD 9.01 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 8.84 
Pittsburgh, PA 7.22 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, 
FL 6.78 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 6.32 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 6.25 
Oklahoma City, OK 5.83 
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3.6.3.4 Cluster 4: moderate-poverty and medium-density 
 
Figure 8: Cluster 4 Map 
 
Cluster 4 was the most common type of poor neighborhood, capturing almost one 
in five census tracts. Cluster 4 was in a virtual tie with Cluster 1 as having the lowest 
initial levels of socioeconomic distress in terms of both poverty rate and MFI ratio. While 
both clusters were majority-white, there was more racial diversity to be found in Cluster 
4. The population of Cluster 4 was relatively well-educated and was also more actively 
engaged with the surrounding labor market than in most other neighborhood types, as 
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indicated by high rates of female labor force participation and employment in 
management positions.  
 In contrast to its initial stability, the socioeconomic trajectory of Cluster 4 during 
the 2000s was worse than the overall average on all five indicators. Similarly, the 
percentages of census tracts in Cluster 4 that received either NMTC or LIHTC 
investment was somewhat lower than in other neighborhood types.  
Table 8: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 4 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 62.96 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 51.75 
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 42.57 
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA 38.21 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 32.69 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 31.58 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 31.05 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 30.70 
Fresno, CA 30.00 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 29.05 
 
3.6.4.5 Cluster 5: lower-density segregated black neighborhoods 
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Figure 9: Cluster 5 Map 
 
 Even in comparison to other poor places, Cluster 5 is notable for its high poverty 
rates, as well as income levels that were barely half of the metro averages. The extreme 
poverty conditions of Cluster 5 disproportionately affected the African American 
community, as over 86 percent of residents in 2000 were black. This was the most 
extreme concentration of any racial or ethnic group among the ten neighborhood types. 
The social and economic isolation of the black population is perhaps the most well-
known and well-documented aspect of poverty in the US. The persistent dislocation of 
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the African American community from local labor markets is one of the major themes to 
have emerged in the literature on concentrated poverty in the last three decades (Massey, 
1993; Wilson, 2012). Thus, it is not surprising to see Cluster 5 typified by year 2000 
attributes that suggest a lack of economic opportunity, such as low levels of education 
and female labor force participation, very few residents employed in high-status jobs, and 
high rates of female-headed households.  
 Though the poverty and racial isolation just described may evoke stereotyped 
images of inner-city ghettos, these tracts were among the least densely populated. 
Looking at the metro areas where Cluster 5 was most common in 2000, two distinct 
contexts emerge. The first places Cluster 5 into smaller metro areas in the Mississippi 
River Delta, and the Deep South more generally. The second context places Cluster 5 
tracts into some of the primary destinations for the waves of rural southern blacks during 
the Great Migration (McHugh, 1987). Furthermore, some of the larger metro areas where 
this neighborhood type is common, such as Detroit, St. Louis, and Baltimore, are 
commonly associated with racial segregation, as well as difficult and sometimes 
traumatic race relations, both by research and in the public consciousness. With above 
average vacancy rates and median home prices less than half the metro averages, the 
neighborhoods in this cluster would likely show some of the telltale physical signs of 
concentrated poverty, including a housing stock that could be described as run down, or 
potentially even dilapidated.  
  Cluster 5 recorded the worst 2000 to 2009-2013 outcomes of all the neighborhood 
types on the MFI, unemployment, and median home values indicators, and were second 
 
 
72 
 
worst in MFI ratio and poverty rate changes. Unfortunately, there was relatively little 
place-based investment in Cluster 5 tracts to help mitigate the wholesale socioeconomic 
decline, as NMTC investment in Cluster 5 was well below average, while LIHTC 
investment was right at the group mean.  
Table 9: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 5 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 58.68 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 51.40 
St. Louis, MO-IL 49.33 
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 48.19 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 39.36 
Kansas City, MO-KS 35.83 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 34.53 
New Orleans-Metairie, LA 34.42 
Cleveland-Elyria, OH 29.78 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 26.73 
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3.6.3.6 Cluster 6: the “average” poor neighborhood 
 
Figure 10: Cluster 6 Map 
 
 Cluster 6 was perhaps the most difficult of all neighborhood types to describe, as 
it did not stand out compared to poor census tracts overall on any year 2000 
neighborhood attribute. On the other hand, the socioeconomic trajectory of Cluster 6 was 
at least one standard deviation worse than the metro average on all five change indicators. 
For NMTC and LIHTC investment intensity, the same “average” pattern reemerged.  
Table 10: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 6 
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Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 31.71 
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 31.37 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 28.42 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 28.04 
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA 27.64 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 26.32 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 25.74 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 25.41 
Oklahoma City, OK 24.17 
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 23.46 
 
3.6.3.7 Cluster 7: black distressed urban neighborhoods 
 
Figure 11: Cluster 7 Map 
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Cluster 7 was the most severely distressed type of poor neighborhood in 2000, as 
it had the lowest average MFI ratio and highest poverty rate. Three quarters of Cluster 7 
residents were black, reinforcing the persistent link between race and concentrated 
poverty. Other indicators of population and neighborhood distress were also present, as 
these tracts had the highest unemployment rates and highest vacancy rates. 
In these important respects, Cluster 7 and Cluster 5 appear to subtle variations of 
the same basic kind of poor and racially isolated neighborhood. However, there are some 
notable differences. For one, Cluster 7 tracts were much more densely populated- they 
had twice the average population density as Cluster 5 tracts, and were also twice as dense 
as their metro averages. In terms of 2000 to 2009-2013 change, Cluster 7 fared much 
better than Cluster 5, and better than poor census tracts overall on all five indicators. In 
particular, MFI ratio change was positive in Cluster 7 tracts, indicating that these tracts 
improved their status within their respective metropolitan areas during the 2000s.  
Furthermore, whereas Cluster 5 tracts had below average levels of place-based 
investment, Cluster 7 had the highest percentage of tracts with LIHTC activity and the 
second highest percentage of tracts with NMTC activity.  
Table 11: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 7 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
Rochester, NY 44.29 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 34.45 
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Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 27.72 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 26.97 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 25.00 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 24.59 
New Orleans-Metairie, LA 22.73 
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 20.99 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 19.63 
Cleveland-Elyria, OH 19.10 
 
3.6.3.8 Cluster 8: diverse distressed urban neighborhoods 
 
Figure 12: Cluster 8 Map 
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Cluster 8 was in a virtual tie with Cluster 7 as the most economically distressed 
neighborhood type in 2000. While Cluster 7 poverty was associated with the racial and 
economic segregation of blacks, Cluster 8 was much more diverse, with a large Hispanic 
population and high percentage of foreign-born residents.  
 With a poorly educated adult population, low levels of workforce participation, 
and few people working in high-status management positions, Cluster 8 appears to most 
heavily reflect the role of human capital in the formation and persistence of concentrated 
poverty.  
 Despite its weak starting point, Cluster 8 remained quite stable from 2000 to 
2009-2013 in terms of poverty, unemployment, and income levels. Home value growth in 
Cluster 8 was greater than in other neighborhood types during the 2000s as well.  
 Cluster 8 attracted a significant amount of place-based investment during the 
2000s, as NMTC investment was highest in this cluster, and was in a virtual tie for the 
highest levels of LIHTC investment with Cluster 7 tracts.  
Table 12: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 8 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 40.20 
Fresno, CA 27.00 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 21.86 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 18.69 
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 17.82 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 17.78 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 16.99 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 16.76 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 15.90 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 15.79 
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3.6.3.9 Cluster 9: high-density immigrant gateways in big metropolitan areas 
 
Figure 13: Cluster 9 Map 
 
 By a wide margin, Cluster 9 was the most densely populated neighborhood type. 
With 32,941 people per square mile, the average census tract in Cluster 9 had a higher 
population density than New York City. Despite having the highest levels of overall 
density, these tracts are ranked second in terms of density relative to density in the 
surrounding metro. This discrepancy suggests that this neighborhood type is a feature of 
large urban centers. Thus, it is little surprise that this was the most common type of 
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neighborhood in the nation’s two largest urban agglomerations, New York City and Los 
Angeles, and the second most common poor neighborhood type in Chicago and San 
Francisco. Cluster 9 tracts were prominent in many other metro areas with large 
immigrant populations.  
 Multi-family rental housing was especially common in Cluster 9. With large 
populations came significant housing demand as well, as the percentage of housing units 
that were vacant in 2000 was lower in Cluster 9 than in any other type of poor 
neighborhood.  
 Whereas some of the other immigrant clusters were specifically tied to 
immigration from Latin America, Cluster 9 tracts had the highest concentration of Asian 
residents in 2000, suggesting that proximity to the Mexican border is not the primary 
explanation for the large numbers of foreign-born residents.  
 Cluster 9 was on a path of strong socioeconomic ascent from 2000 to 2009-2013. 
While poverty increased in all ten neighborhood types over the course of the 2000s, it 
increased the least in Cluster 9. The most notable aspect of ascent may be the explosion 
in housing prices. The median home in Cluster 9 increased in value by nearly $132,000 
during the 2000s, more than three times the average for poor census tracts overall.  
 Despite the clear upward socioeconomic trajectory, place-based investment in 
Cluster 9 was average. The percentage of Cluster 9 tracts with NMTC activity was 
slightly above average, while LIHTC activity was slightly below.  
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Table 13: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 9 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 35.23 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 30.31 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 20.67 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 19.10 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 17.44 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL 16.71 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-
WV 13.41 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 11.68 
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 8.91 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 8.11 
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3.6.3.10 Cluster 10: college town neighborhoods 
 
Figure 14: Cluster 10 Map 
 
As discussed in the methods section, I excluded from the analysis a small subset 
of “high poverty-high income” census tracts that were found to be poor primarily due to 
their proximity to large university campuses. However, even after taking this step, the 
cluster analysis still identified a group of highly educated, moderately distressed census 
tracts as a distinct neighborhood type. Cluster 10 was the most common neighborhood 
type in many smaller metro areas in which the local economy is defined by a large 
research university, such as Iowa City, IA, Ithaca, NY, and Lawrence, KS.  
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 Cluster 10 arguably improved more than any other neighborhood type during the 
2000s. For one, it was the only cluster in which inflation-adjusted median income 
increased. It was also the only cluster in which, by 2009-2013, the average MFI ratio had 
increased to above 80 percent threshold that serves as one of the primary NMTC 
eligibility criteria. Thus, many of the census tracts in Cluster 10 that were eligible for 
NMTC in 2000 based on the MFI ratio requirement were likely no longer eligible by the 
end of the decade.  
The only indicator in which Cluster 10 was not among the top one or two 
performers was poverty. The contrast of steady poverty against a backdrop of significant 
improvement on the other four socioeconomic indicators lends support for the idea that 
the cause of poverty in Cluster 10 is a function of student housing, which is annually 
replenished with a new cohort of temporarily poor freshmen.  
 The biggest contrast between NMTC and LIHTC investment levels occurred in 
Cluster 10, where NMTC investment was 1.2 percentage points above the overall average 
while LIHTC investment was 2.08 percentage points below average.   
Table 14: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 10 
 
Metropolitan Area Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA 
Austin-Round Rock, TX 17.24 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 15.79 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 14.36 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN 13.48 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 13.16 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 11.68 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 11.54 
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Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 11.11 
Columbus, OH 10.78 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-
WV 9.76 
 
3.6.4 SES Change and Investment Patterns 
3.6.4.1 SES change 
 
Figure 15 plots the 2000 to 2009-2013 changes in MFI, MFI ratio, poverty, 
unemployment, and home values for each neighborhood type. All values were 
standardized as z-scores, and poverty and unemployment were recoded to give a uniform 
interpretation for positive and negative values on all change indicators.  
Overall, the direction of socioeconomic change for each neighborhood type was 
consistent across all measures. One exception is Cluster 2, Hispanic Immigrant Gateway 
neighborhoods, which saw less income and home value growth than other poor 
neighborhood types, yet fared better in terms of poverty and unemployment change. The 
relative stability in Cluster 2 on the latter two indicators may reflect one of the few 
positive externalities recognized in the literature as arising out of certain contexts of 
concentrated poverty. Because many gateway neighborhoods are populated by residents 
hailing from the same city, or even the same neighborhood in their country of origin 
(Massey, Goldring, & Durand, 1994), those preexisting social ties and institutions may 
facilitate the assimilation of new arrivals by providing enhanced access to social services 
and employment opportunities (P. A. Jargowsky, 2009). 
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The other notable exception is Cluster 10, College Town Neighborhoods. The 
contrast of slightly above average growth in the poverty rate against strong performance 
on the other four measures seen is most likely a function of the annual churn of 
graduating seniors being replaced with new cohorts of temporarily poor freshmen, which 
naturally makes poverty an enduring feature in these neighborhoods, regardless of other 
socioeconomic trends.  
As mentioned earlier, I organized the neighborhood clusters in order from least to 
most densely populated, relative to the population density of the surrounding metro area. 
Thus, Figure 15 shows a clear association between higher initial relative population 
density and better subsequent socioeconomic outcomes. Socioeconomic ascent was 
almost entirely concentrated in the four clusters with the highest relative population 
densities. Clusters 1 and 2, which had the lowest relative densities, experienced below-
average outcomes on multiple indicators, while Clusters 3 through 6 experienced worse 
outcomes than the average poor census tract on all five indicators of socioeconomic 
change.  
Lending further support for the notion that population density was one of the 
primary drivers of socioeconomic ascent for poor neighborhoods during the 2000s, 
neither the neighborhood distress index nor the black isolation index was significantly 
related to any of the socioeconomic change indicators. On the other hand, the 
neighborhood dimension represented by the urbanization index was significantly 
correlated with 2000 to 2009-2013 income growth, r = .69, p < .05, home value growth, r 
= .65, p < .05 and falling unemployment r = .75, p < .05.  
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Figure 15: 2000 to 2009-2013 Socioeconomic Changes by Cluster 
 
3.6.4.2 NMTC and LIHTC investment  
There was a significant relationship between the percent of census tracts in a 
neighborhood cluster that received NMTC investment and the percent that received 
LIHTC investment, r = .83, p < .01. The percent of census tracts that received both 
NMTC and LIHTC investment was also significantly correlated with NMTC investment, 
r = .97, p < .0001, and LIHTC investment, r = .78, p < .01.  
The consistent parallels in NMTC investment and LIHTC investment within and 
across neighborhood types suggests at least two things. First, it lends support for the idea 
that, because NMTC and LIHTC employ similar market-driven mechanisms to deliver 
resources into distressed areas, they are drawn towards the same types of poor places. 
Second, it shows that the neighborhood dimensions uncovered by the PCA, which 
provided the basis for classifying distinct types of poor neighborhoods, do bear some 
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meaningful resemblance to the unobserved neighborhood characteristics that NMTC and 
LIHTC developers pay attention to and care about when making location decisions. To 
the degree that these assertions are accurate, using this typology to further investigate 
NMTC and LIHTC investment may yield important new insights about the unobserved 
neighborhood- level drivers of treatment selection in these kinds of market-driven 
programs.   
 Visualizing NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns across the neighborhood 
types provides an immediate clue about at least one important factor. Figure 16 shows a 
clear trend towards increasing levels of NMTC and LIHTC investment in more densely 
populated clusters. Thus, it is not surprising that the urbanization index was significantly 
correlated with the percent of census tracts that received both NMTC and LIHTC 
investment, r = .78, p < .01, the percent that received NMTC, r = .83, p < .01, and was 
significant at the ten percent level for LIHTC investment. There was no significant 
association between NMTC or LIHTC investment and either of the two other 
neighborhood dimensions. 
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Figure 16: NMTC and LIHTC Investment Intensity by Cluster 
 
However, the sharp drop in the percentage of census tracts receiving investment 
in clusters 9 and 10 suggests that NMTC and LIHTC locational patterns during the 2000s 
were not only a function of urbanization. Further analysis revealed that the initial level of 
socioeconomic distress in a census tract was the other major factor driving NMTC and 
LIHTC locational patterns. Figure 17 highlights the marked difference in the initial 
poverty rates and MFI ratios of high-density clusters with high levels of NMTC and 
LIHTC investment (clusters 7 and 8) and those with relatively little investment (clusters 9 
and 10). On both measures, Cluster 7 and Cluster 8 were the two most socioeconomically 
distressed neighborhood types in 2000. In contrast, Cluster 9 was average among 
neighborhood types on both measures, while Cluster 10 was somewhat better off than the 
average for all neighborhood types in 2000.  
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Figure 17: Standardized Poverty Rate and MFI Ratio by Cluster in 2000 
 
The link between initial levels of socioeconomic distress and subsequent NMTC 
and LIHTC investment may also explain why there was no significant association 
between a neighborhood type’s 2000 to 2009-2013 socioeconomic change and the 
frequency of place-based investment. As discussed in Chapter 2 and at the beginning of 
this chapter, both NMTC and LIHTC include provisions intended to influence the 
behavior of the actors involved in their administration and use by providing various 
additional incentives for locating projects into areas with higher levels of socioeconomic 
distress than basic program requirements dictate. Thus, the apparent attraction of NMTC 
and LIHTC investment to highly distressed neighborhoods over places with similar levels 
of population density that were only moderately distressed, may be a function of these 
provisions, rather than a reflection of the true preferences of market actors.  
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This finding indicates that these provisions are effective tools for distributing 
place-based investment dollars to a wider and more diverse array of distressed places 
than might otherwise be observed, without being so restrictive as to eliminate program 
demand. However, the uneven application of these provisions across all eligible places is 
consequential in the context of this study. Given the relatively loose criteria I established 
for identifying a study population of low-income, high-poverty census tracts, the study 
area is effectively divided into two key subgroups in which different combinations of 
NMTC and LIHTC provisions apply. The first subgroup includes the moderately 
distressed census tracts that met the basic NMTC requirements, but did not meet the 
stricter poverty/income/unemployment requirements to be defined as “high distress” 
under NMTC, and similarly did not meet the poverty/income requirements for additional 
LIHTC tax credits. The second consists of census tracts that met the additional poverty 
and income requirements to receive full consideration and favor of both NMTC and 
LIHTC. 
The inclusion of census tracts governed by two different sets of incentives 
complicates one of the main goals of this study, which is to use the observed locational 
patterns of NMTC and LIHTC investment across neighborhood types to discover the 
latent drivers of treatment selection related to the preferences of developers. Because 
program provisions effectively steer development towards the neighborhood types 
primarily populated by high distress census tracts, the true preferences of developers are 
obscured.  
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3.6.5 Analysis of Severely distressed Subset 
To eliminate, or at least reduce, the influence of the various NMTC and LIHTC 
program provisions on developers’ decision-making processes, I ran the same analysis 
just discussed on a subset of severely distressed census tracts.  As mentioned in the 
Methods section, this severely distressed subset consists of 5,161 census tracts that in 
2000 had both (a) greater than 25 percent poverty and (b) MFI ratio less than 60 percent. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 15, and main results and analysis are 
presented below.
  
9
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Table 15. Descriptive Statistics of Severely distressed Clusters 
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
n 517 546 956 481 603 958 796 304 
Year 2000 Attributes (% unless noted)        
Poverty 29.42 31.88 34.56 49.39 34.38 34.06 36.7 45.23 
MFI Ratio (tract/metro) 53.24 51.52 46.85 31.41 45.78 45.75 43.43 32.64 
Unemployment 10.81 12.07 16.17 23.27 14.64 12.87 14.17 18.93 
Black 32.86 4.68 88.30 85.59 72.58 12.92 37.00 20.77 
Hispanic 22.02 79.71 2.60 5.28 7.16 54.53 23.58 56.99 
Asian 3.17 4.24 0.53 0.96 1.55 8.91 4.33 5.49 
Recent immigrant 7.45 19.31 0.96 2.02 3.75 19.89 9.85 15.26 
Foreign-born 14.11 43.22 2.01 3.95 7.11 40.12 18.67 31.81 
High school or less 68.18 81.22 70.40 75.70 65.60 72.28 60.79 76.18 
Bachelors or more 9.30 4.93 6.87 5.91 10.64 9.92 16.81 7.69 
Females in labor force 52.18 43.10 50.62 45.65 54.54 46.00 52.45 39.67 
Work in management 17.69 11.90 17.11 16.11 20.47 17.03 23.84 17.45 
Vacancy rate 11.04 5.80 15.45 16.44 14.60 7.46 10.71 7.68 
Housing owner-occupied 48.16 42.49 50.84 25.70 32.21 25.48 21.38 10.27 
Pop density (mi2) 6215 11725 6959 9025 10681 23528 17997 43186 
Pop. density ratio (tract/metro) 152.24 162.71 173.38 185.26 195.42 212.99 223.78 261.59 
Housing in multi-unit structure 34.38 35.29 27.71 58.66 58.77 65.33 73.46 88.46 
Home value ratio (tract/metro) 0.53 0.58 0.42 0.47 0.59 0.67 0.70 0.73 
Neighborhood Dimension z-scores       
Class Status -0.26 -1.55 0.92 1.34 0.80 -0.98 0.08 -0.52 
Urbanization  -0.82 -0.75 -0.90 0.44 0.14 0.35 0.82 1.37 
Black Socioeconomic Isolation -0.82 0.17 -0.19 1.40 -0.48 0.03 -0.39 1.35 
2000 to 2009-2013 SES Change       
  
9
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Table 15 (continued)         
Poverty 5.31 1.94 5.72 0.00 4.60 1.07 2.73 -3.54 
MFI -2913 -2321 -4454 1081 -1381 -768 2641 3232 
MFI Ratio -0.88 -0.76 -2.46 3.88 1.07 0.39 4.54 4.22 
Unemployment 6.57 2.19 8.05 2.95 6.10 2.08 2.00 -2.34 
Median home value ($) 22200 40415 6501 32104 39193 90046 73639 115122 
2003-2007 NMTC/LIHTC Investment       
NMTC and LIHTC 1.55 0.92 0.63 1.04 1.82 2.09 3.02 3.62 
NMTC 5.42 4.76 3.87 7.69 7.46 8.66 9.92 10.53 
LIHTC 16.83 14.10 14.33 19.33 19.73 15.76 19.72 31.58 
 
 
93 
 
3.6.5.1 Neighborhood dimensions 
 As before, the first step was to enter the thirteen neighborhood indicators into a 
PCA. The variables again coalesced around three neighborhood dimensions. The 
component loadings, shown in Table 16, find that the same underlying dimensions that 
described the full set of high- and moderate-distress census tracts describe severely 
distressed census tracts alone, with only minor differences.  
Table 16. Component Loadings for Severely distressed Tracts 
 TC1 TC2 TC3 
black.pct.00 0.89 -0.17 0.01 
other.race.00 -0.89 0.1 0.24 
hh_female_kids.pct.00 0.82 0.11 0.23 
homes_vacant.pct.00 0.61 -0.2 0.09 
own.pct.00 0.1 -0.91 -0.12 
homes_multi_unit.pct.00 -0.07 0.9 -0.05 
mhmval.00.ratio -0.26 0.61 -0.27 
density.00.ratio -0.02 0.38 -0.09 
hs.pct.00 -0.27 -0.41 0.71 
female_labor.pct.00 0.36 0.14 -0.71 
poverty.pct.00 0.27 0.25 0.69 
mfi.ratio.00 -0.29 -0.42 -0.65 
unemp.pct.00 0.37 0.07 0.54 
 
The first neighborhood dimension is an index of black isolation. The second 
dimension is an urbanization index that, in the severely distressed case, places more 
emphasis on relative housing prices than relative population density. The third dimension 
is an index of neighborhood distress that incorporates educational attainment and job 
status of residents as important definitional components. The main point of departure 
between this and the earlier model, is that the black isolation index explains a larger 
proportion of the variance in the data when only severely distressed tracts are considered.   
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3.6.5.2 Neighborhood Types 
 The second step was to run a cluster analysis on the neighborhood dimensions. 
The cluster solution with the highest BIC, and thus the best model fit, came from an 
algorithm producing eight clusters of varying shape, equal volume, and varying 
orientation (VEV). Table 17 shows the redistribution of the severely distressed census 
tracts from the original cluster to which they belonged to their new cluster in the 8-cluster 
solution. Looking across each row, the original clusters 1, 4, and 10 were almost entirely 
composed of moderately-distressed census tracts that were excluded from this part of the 
analysis. For the original neighborhood clusters that contained larger proportions of 
severely distressed tracts, those tracts were in some cases redistributed almost entirely to 
a single severely distressed cluster (original clusters 2, 5), while others were divided 
between two or three severely distressed clusters (original clusters 3, 6, 9), and a couple 
were spread across several severely distressed clusters (original clusters 7, 8). Looking 
down each column, the severely distressed clusters were for the most part populated by 
subgroups of census tracts from between one and three of the original clusters.  
3.6.5.3 SES Change and Investment Patterns  
Many of the patterns and trends uncovered in the primary analysis reemerged 
when severely distressed census tracts were examined alone. For example, figure 3.6 
visualizes the clear and consistent positive association between relative population 
density and socioeconomic trajectory. Another similarity that carried over is the parallel 
patterning of NMTC and LIHTC investment across severely distressed neighborhood 
clusters. There was a significant relationship between the percent of census tracts in a 
neighborhood cluster that received NMTC investment, and the percent that received 
LIHTC investment, r = .75, p < .05. The percent of census tracts that received both 
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NMTC and LIHTC investment in a neighborhood cluster was also significantly 
correlated with NMTC investment, r = .90, p < .01, and LIHTC investment, r = .80, p < 
.05.  
 
 
Figure 18. SES Change by Severely distressed Cluster 
 
On the other hand, the analysis of severely distressed tracts alone revealed some 
points of departure relevant to this study. In the initial analysis, when both moderate- and 
severely distressed tracts were included, levels of NMTC and LIHTC investment in a 
neighborhood type were not significantly correlated with any of the socioeconomic 
change indicators. This was unexpected, as recent studies point out that developers 
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utilizing both NMTC and LIHTC are likely to actively seek out areas that, at least in their 
minds, are on an upward socioeconomic trajectory.  
There are at least three possible explanations for the discrepancy between the 
literature and my findings. The first is that, as discussed earlier, the study population is 
effectively divided into two subgroups of distressed places according to the relevance of 
various determinants of site selection. Another possibility is that developers are 
motivated to locate projects into socioeconomically ascending areas, but lack either the 
information or insight to make accurate predictions about a poor neighborhood’s future 
state. Third, it could be the case that developers’ location decisions are motivated by 
factors unrelated to socioeconomic trajectory.  
When severely distressed census tracts were examined alone, levels of NMTC and 
LIHTC investment in a neighborhood type were significantly correlated with multiple 
aspects of socioeconomic change. Thus, it appears that the first explanation is the most 
likely. By narrowing the focus to a subset of places where all relevant program provisions 
have been satisfied, NMTC and LIHTC locational patterns can be investigated in 
contexts where there are no explicit external factors forcing developers to weigh their 
natural preferences for neighborhoods bearing certain combinations of attractive 
attributes against incentives or disincentives unrelated to these attributes. 
Having removed the influence of provisions designed to make moderate-distress 
census tracts less attractive that severely distressed ones, Figure 3.7 shows a positive 
association between relative population density and frequency of place-based investment 
that is uninterrupted.  
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Figure 19. NMTC & LIHTC Investment by Severely distressed Cluster 
 
The urbanization dimension was significantly positively correlated with all five 
measures of 2000 to 2009-2013 socioeconomic change, as well as with all three measures 
of place-based investment (percent of tracts that received (a) NMTC, (b) LIHTC, and (c) 
NMTC and LIHTC). In other words, higher scores on the urbanization index were 
associated with both socioeconomic ascent and higher levels of place-based investment.  
There was also a significant association between higher scores on the black 
isolation index and declines in 2000 to 2009-2013 poverty. The two neighborhood 
clusters with the highest average scores on the black isolation index also had the highest 
initial poverty rates of all the severely distressed clusters. Thus, it is possible that this 
association may reflect encouraging gains made within the poorest and most racially 
isolated neighborhood types; alternatively, it is also possibly a ceiling effect of sorts.  
There were no significant correlations with either of the other two neighborhood 
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dimensions. Furthermore, the observed neighborhood attributes associated with 
urbanization, such as percent owner-occupied homes, percent of housing in multi-unit 
structures, and population density, were all significantly correlated with most or all 
socioeconomic change measures, as well as NMTC/LIHTC investment measures. Only a 
few other observed neighborhood variables that were unrelated to urbanization were 
correlated with single measures of socioeconomic change or NMTC/LIHTC investment.  
Thus, it appears that the preferences of developers seeking locations for NMTC 
and LIHTC-subsidized development were in large part a function of how urbanized an 
area was.   
3.7 Discussion & Conclusions 
 This study has several important theoretical and applied policymaking 
implications. First, the two neighborhood typologies that were identified, one containing 
both moderate-distress and severely distressed census tracts, and the other focused on 
severely distresseded census tracts alone, underscore the reality that the consequences of 
concentrated poverty are a problem facing a diverse range of places and populations. The 
classification of poor census tracts according to their levels of socioeconomic distress, 
urbanization, and black isolation revealed the existence of several distinct types of poor 
places that exist throughout the metropolitan landscape from the inner cities to the 
outlying suburbs, and that are home to populations of all variety of demographic 
backgrounds.  
Second, while calls to recognize the problem of suburban poverty have gotten 
louder and more frequent in recent years, the finding that urbanization was a primary 
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driver of both socioeconomic ascent and multiple forms of place-based investment 
highlights the challenges that distressed neighborhoods in the suburbs must confront. The 
current popularity of market-based solutions that tend to favor more densely populated 
areas suggests the need for policy solutions that specifically address the issue of suburban 
poverty, which is still too often overlooked.  
 Third, the finding that NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns closely mirrored 
one another across the different neighborhood types justifies two of the primary concerns 
that motivated this dissertation. The first is that the preferences of developers, who play a 
key role in determining where NMTC and LIHTC-subsidized projects are located, have 
not been studied in depth, leading to uncertainty in evaluations of program impact that 
treatment selection has been fully and adequately specified. Given the similar 
mechanisms through which NMTC and LIHTC resources are delivered into poor 
neighborhoods, the parallel locational patterns of NMTC and LIHTC investment are 
likely driven by a common underlying force. Although they have never been examined 
together, previous studies of both programs independently suggest that this force is 
related to the preferences of developers. 
The analysis found that neighborhood attributes relating to the level of 
urbanization, moderated by program provisions that favor investment in severely 
distressed over moderate-distress areas, largely accounted for the locational patterns of 
both NMTC and LIHTC investment. Thus, this study offers the clearest image yet of the 
preference structure of market actors involved in programs like NMTC and LIHTC. 
Ensuring that census tracts that received either NMTC or LIHTC investment had 
 
 
100 
 
identical pre-treatment levels of urbanization as those selected to provide the 
counterfactual addresses this model’s misspecification concern, which has been 
independently raised in previous studies of both programs.  
 The second concern motivating this dissertation is that, due to their underlying 
similarities, evaluating the impact of either program on neighborhood conditions will lead 
to biased estimates if the presence of the other program in similar kinds of poor places is 
not taken into account. The neighborhood types identified through the cluster analysis are 
defined by their similar configurations along three complex, underlying neighborhood 
dimensions. That such strong parallels in NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns were 
observed in this complex setting suggests this concern is not unfounded.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE EFFECTS OF NMTC AND LIHTC INVESTMENT ON LOCAL 
SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITITIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter revealed important clues about the underlying links between 
the different types of poor neighborhoods and the locational patterns of place-based 
investment. It found that the neighborhood types that experienced the strongest and most 
consistent socioeconomic improvement from 2000 to 2009-2013 also attracted higher 
concentrations of investment through both NMTC and LIHTC. This lends support for the 
assumption made in previous research on both programs that developers seek out 
locations that they expect will improve over time.  
The previous chapter also found that the neighborhood dimension describing the 
degree of urbanization in a census tract in 2000 was correlated with subsequent NMTC 
investment, LIHTC investment, and multiple indicators of neighborhood socioeconomic 
change. No other neighborhood dimension or individual observed attribute was 
consistently related with both types of place-based investment and also socioeconomic 
change. This suggests that the urbanization dimension uncovered through principal 
components analysis may serve as a close approximation of the latent construct of 
“developer preferences.” The only caveat to this is that among the highly urbanized 
neighborhood types identified, those that were only moderately distressed in 2000 
received less investment through NMTC and LIHTC than those that had higher initial 
levels of socioeconomic distress. Thus, while developers have the most direct influence 
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on where NMTC- and LIHTC-subsidized projects are located, their preferences may be 
moderated by program provisions that encourage development in areas with lower 
income and higher poverty rates than the basic eligibility requirements dictate. 
The current chapter investigates the effects of NMTC investment and LIHTC 
investment on socioeconomic outcomes in distressed neighborhoods. The insights from 
the previous chapter regarding the underlying processes driving NMTC and LIHTC site 
selection are applied to the development of a quasiexperimental model that addresses a 
methodological issue that has haunted previous evaluations: the potential for model 
misspecification due to the unobserved preferences of developers for certain types of 
poor places.  
For both NMTC and LIHTC, it was found that the urbanization dimension was 
the primary underlying driver of site selection. In an evaluation focused on either NMTC 
or LIHTC, taking extra care to ensure the pretreatment similarity of treated and 
comparison census tracts on this dimension, or at least on the observed attributes 
associated with it, such as homeownership rates, proportion of single family housing, 
population density, and home values, would go a long way to bolstering confidence in 
estimates of program impact.  
However, this same finding, that NMTC and LIHTC site selection appears to be 
driven by the same underlying process, raises a new methodological question that has 
never before been considered: given the parallels in the neighborhood attributes that 
attract NMTC and LIHTC investment, does evaluating one program without controlling 
for the presence of the other result in biased estimates of program impact?   
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The similarities in NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns within and across 
neighborhood types are not just superficial, given that the neighborhood clusters were 
identified by their similarities across three complex unobserved neighborhood 
dimensions. Thus, even if a reasonably good job is done of properly specifying site 
selection in an evaluation of one program or the other, there remains the distinct 
possibility that the group of treated tracts were more likely than the comparison group to 
have been targeted by the program that is not the focus of the evaluation.   
Omitting an important explanatory variable from a model is a concern regardless 
of the direction in which estimates are biased. However, the issue takes on an interesting 
twist in the current study, considering the controversy surrounding LIHTC’s place-based 
provisions, which provide developers with additional incentives to locate affordable 
housing development specifically in places that are already disproportionately poor. As a 
consequence, there is evidence that at least in some neighborhood contexts, LIHTC-
subsidized development exacerbates existing patterns of concentrated poverty or 
otherwise has a negative impact on indicators neighborhood socioeconomic well-being. 
In contrast, there is little debate that the worst-case scenario for NMTC would be a 
finding that it is a non-factor in efforts to revitalize distressed neighborhoods.  
Assuming for the moment that the overall effect of LIHTC-subsidized housing 
development in poor neighborhoods is to push the socioeconomic trajectory of targeted 
areas downward, then an omitted LIHTC variable in an evaluation focused on NMTC 
would effectively cancel out some of the true positive socioeconomic gains attributable to 
NMTC. In an evaluation focused on LIHTC, the unaccounted-for revitalizing effects of 
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NMTC development would similarly mask some of the poverty-concentrating effects of 
LIHTC. 
The current chapter proposes an evaluation approach that embraces the unique 
relationship between NMTC and LIHTC. The insights gained from the previous chapter 
regarding the underlying neighborhood factors that drive both NMTC and LIHTC site 
selection are applied to several counterfactual models that attempt to estimate the 
socioeconomic changes a distressed census tract would have experienced from 2000 to 
2009-2013 if it had received no place-based investment, or if it had received some 
combination of NMTC/LIHTC investment other than the treatment combination that it 
did receive. In total, NMTC and LIHTC treatment effects are examined through the six 
models shown in 17, along with the predicted differences in outcomes for each set of 
treatment and comparison census tracts.  
Table 17. Treatment-comparison models and predicted effect of treatment 
 
Model Treatment   Comparison  Treatment effect 
1 NMTC and LIHTC NMTC only  - 
2 NMTC and LIHTC LIHTC only  + 
3 NMTC and LIHTC Neither  No difference 
4 NMTC only   LIHTC only  + 
5 NMTC only   Neither  + 
6 LIHTC only   Neither  - 
 
While questions remain as to whether LIHTC-subsidized housing development 
helps or hurts low-income communities, the hypotheses continue with the assumption 
that the poverty-concentrating effects of LIHTC outweigh its potential to revitalize 
distressed areas. Thus, model 1 predicts that a census tract that received only NMTC 
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investment would have experienced worse socioeconomic outcomes if it had instead 
received both NMTC and LIHTC investment. Model 2 predicts that the injection of 
NMTC investment into a census tract that only received LIHTC would have the opposite 
effect, producing improved socioeconomic outcomes. Model 3 predicts that the positive 
externalities generated by NMTC investment are effectively cancelled out by the poverty 
concentrating effects of LIHTC. Thus, a census tract that received no form of place-based 
treatment would have experienced the same socioeconomic outcomes if it had instead 
been targeted by both NMTC and LIHTC. Model 4 predicts that if a census tract that 
received LIHTC investment had instead received NMTC investment, it would have 
experienced better socioeconomic outcomes.  Models 5 and 6 represent the typical 
evaluation design that estimates the treatment effects of a single program against the 
counterfactual of no treatment. When compared to low-income census tracts not targeted 
by either program, model 5 predicts that NMTC investment improves socioeconomic 
outcomes, while model 6 predicts that LIHTC continues to demonstrate a negative impact 
on indicators of socioeconomic well-being. 
 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Define Program Treatment  
In the previous chapter, program treatment was defined in binary terms, requiring 
only that some nonzero amount of investment had been received. That simple 
operationalization was sufficient, as the primary concern was with the locations of 
NMTC- and LIHTC-subsidized projects. In the current chapter, the goal is to estimate the 
socioeconomic effects of those investments. Recognizing that bigger investments would 
 
 
106 
 
generally be expected to yield more significant local changes, a more comprehensive 
operational definition of program treatment was needed to accomplish the goals of this 
evaluation.  
Research on a different place-based program, the Community Development Block 
Grant (CDBG) program, offers some insight for defining program treatment. Galster and 
colleagues (Galster, Tatian, & Accordino, 2006; Galster, Walker, Hayes, Boxall, & 
Johnson, 2004) found that CDBG spending in a census tract above the mean level of 
spending for all census tracts in the same metropolitan area represented an important 
threshold of investment, above which significant improvements in neighborhood 
conditions were realized. Unfortunately, there were quite a few metropolitan areas in the 
current study in which only one or two census tracts received NMTC or LIHTC 
investment. In these cases, the mean level of metropolitan spending obviously cannot 
serve as a meaningful investment threshold. Still, I thought it important to impose some 
minimum program treatment threshold. Because the literature on NMTC and LIHTC 
provides no relevant guidance, a relatively lenient figure of $100,000 was selected for 
this purpose. There were 91 census tracts that from 2003 to 2007 received nonzero 
amounts of NMTC or LIHTC investment less than $100,000. They were eliminated from 
further analysis.  
Of the 14,659 census tracts that remained, 2,332, or approximately 16 percent, 
received some form of place-based investment between 2003 and 2007. There were 734 
that received NMTC investment and 1,764 that received LIHTC. While most census 
tracts were targeted by only one program or the other, 166 were targeted by both NMTC 
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and LIHTC. This small, yet not insignificant subset of distressed census tracts that 
received investment through both programs suggests the delineation of three distinct 
categories of place-based treatment, as it was possible for a census tract to have been 
targeted by (a) NMTC alone, (b) LIHTC alone, or (c) by both NMTC and LIHTC. 
4.2.2 Generate Propensity Scores 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is an approach for making causal claims in 
observational studies when random assignment into treatment and control groups is not 
possible. It is a multi-step process that begins with the assignment of a “propensity score” 
to all observations in a data set. In general, the propensity score is calculated by 
regressing a dummy treatment variable onto a set of pretreatment attributes using logistic 
regression or another model appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables. The fitted 
value for each observation is interpreted as its predicted probability of receiving the 
treatment given its pretreatment characteristics. This value, which ranges from 0 to 1, is 
its propensity score.  
The propensity score of each treated observation is then compared to the 
propensity scores from a pool of untreated observations. The goal of the matching 
procedure is, for each treated observation, to identify one or more corresponding 
untreated observations with identical propensity scores. All untreated observations 
without propensity scores identical to any of the treated observations are removed from 
the comparison pool. Similarly, any treated observations for which there are no suitable 
comparisons may also be excluded from analysis. What remains is a matched sample of 
observations that had the same predicted probability of receiving the treatment given a set 
of pretreatment characteristics. If all relevant pretreatment factors related to treatment 
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selection were included in the matching procedure, and there were suitable comparison 
observations to be found for most or all of the treated ones, the only relevant difference 
between the treatment and comparison groups should be the treatment itself (Ho et al., 
2007).  
Because there are multiple treatment conditions in this study, a modification of 
the typical approach to PSM was necessary. Using methods developed and validated by 
Lechner (2001, 2002) for simultaneously calculating the predicted probabilities that an 
observation will receive each of multiple potential treatments, I coded a variable that 
placed each census tract into one of four mutually exclusive treatment groups. Based on 
the definition of program treatment described above, the variable reflected whether a 
census tract received above-threshold levels of investment through (a) both NMTC and 
LIHTC; (b) NMTC only; (c) LIHTC only; or (d) neither NMTC nor LIHTC. This 
treatment combination variable, treat.combo, then served as the dependent variable in the 
following multinomial logit regression: 
treat.combo = mfi.ratio.00 + poverty.pct.00 + own.pct.00 + homes_multi_unit.pct.00 + 
unemp.pct.00 + density.00.ratio + mhmval.00.ratio + black.pct.00 + other.race.00+ 
mhmval.90ch + urbanization 
Where 
 mfi.ratio.00 = MFI ratio in 2000 
 poverty.pct.00 = poverty rate  
 own.pct.00 = percent of housing units that were owner-occupied  
 homes_multi_unit.pct.00 = percent of housing units located in multi-unit 
structures 
 unemp.pct.00 = unemployment rate  
 density.00.ratio = population density in census tract / metropolitan area  
 mhmval.00.ratio = median home value in census tract / metropolitan area  
 black.pct.00 = percent black  
 other.race.00 = percent neither non-Hispanic black nor non-Hispanic white  
 mhmval.90ch = mhmval.00.ratio – mhmval.90.ratio 
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 urbanization = component score for urbanization dimension identified through 
PCA  
 
The validity of estimates generated through PSM depend on the specification of a 
matching model that fully and properly accounts for “all variables that affect both the 
treatment assignment and, controlling for the treatment, the dependent variable (Ho et al., 
2007).” If important variables are not included in the matching process, or if the matching 
criteria are not sufficiently strict for key variables, then significant bias can be introduced 
into the model, making it impossible to confidently attribute observed differences 
between treated and untreated groups to the effects of the treatment (Ho et al., 2007). To 
meet the requirements for causal validity, the matching model in the current study must 
therefore include the neighborhood attributes of census tracts in 2000 that affected both 
(a) its chances of being selected for NMTC and/or LIHTC during the 2000s, and (b) its 
2000 to 2009-2013 socioeconomic trajectory.  
 Thus, the independent variables included in the regression equation were selected 
to provide a well-rounded view of distressed census tracts eligible for NMTC and LIHTC 
at a point in time shortly before treatment assignment occurred. Care was taken to include 
variables that the findings from the previous chapter, as well as evidence from other 
sources, suggest would have figured prominently in the decision-making process of 
developers.  
The only variables requiring any further explanation are perhaps urbanization and 
mhmval.90ch. The variable urbanization is an index of the urbanization dimension 
identified by PCA in the previous chapter (the composition of this index is shown in 
Table 3 under the column TC2). It was found to be closely related to patterns of both 
 
 
110 
 
NMTC/LIHTC investment and neighborhood socioeconomic change. Consequently, the 
weighted combination of pretreatment neighborhood attributes contained within this 
index were determined to bear close resemblance to the latent construct of “developer 
preferences,” which previous studies have identified as an important, yet unobserved 
driver of treatment selection. Though the observed variables that this index most strongly 
relates to are also included in the model in their original uncombined forms, there is a 
potential benefit to including them in their combined form as well, as Jakubowski (2014) 
finds that matching observations on latent variables may yield estimates with smaller 
standard errors.  
The variable mhmval.90ch represents the change in rank in the median home 
value of a census tract from 1990 to 2000, within its metropolitan area. Thus, census 
tracts with values greater than 1 on this variable experienced housing appreciation that 
outpaced the metropolitan area average in the decade leading up to the study baseline. 
Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) used a similar variable to represent recent gentrification 
in an evaluation of LIHTC, and found that it related to both the locations and effects of 
future LIHTC investment. Furthermore, all the other independent variables describe the 
static attributes of census tracts in 2000. Given that neighborhoods are constantly 
changing and evolving, it was important to include at least one dynamic measure to 
represent a census tract’s recent history and socioeconomic trajectory as of 2000.  
 Instead of a single propensity score, four separate propensity scores were 
generated to represent the predicted probabilities of receiving each of the treatment 
combinations. Table 18 summarizes the predicted probabilities for each of the four 
treatment categories.  
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Table 18. Predicted Probabilities of Receiving each Treatment (%) 
 
Treatment  Mean  Minimum  Maximum  
NMTC and LIHTC  1.13  0.00  25.09  
NMTC only  3.87  0.02  24.47  
LIHTC only  10.90  0.42  43.64  
Neither   84.09  31.93  99.55  
 
 
4.2.3 Match Treatment-Comparison Subsets 
 The matching procedure was performed using the R package Matching. First, the 
data was split into six subsets of census tracts, corresponding to the treatment and 
comparison groups outlined in Table 20. The following steps were performed on each 
subset of the data.  
For each census tract in the treatment group, the pool of potential matches was 
restricted to those comparison tracts that were classified into the same neighborhood type 
in Chapter 3.  One-to-one matching was used, meaning that each treated census tract was 
paired with the census tract from the comparison pool with smallest difference in 
propensity score. Census tracts were only considered matches if their propensity scores 
were within .25 standard deviations of each other. Thus, all census tracts from the 
treatment group that could not be matched with a sufficiently similar comparison tract 
were discarded.  
What results is a dataset containing an equal number of treated and comparison 
observations. If the matching procedure was successful, the pretreatment characteristics 
of the treatment and comparison groups should be indistinguishable. There is no single 
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metric or rule for determining if a matched dataset is sufficiently balanced. Rather, the 
user should employ multiple diagnostic tools to make that judgement (Ho et al., 2007). 
The appendix provides the differences in the mean values of each treatment-comparison 
group before and after the matching procedure was performed.  
4.2.4 Estimate Treatment Effects 
 The final step was to estimate the effects receiving one combination of 
NMTC/LIHTC treatment, relative to either a different NMTC/LIHTC treatment 
combination or no treatment. Difference- in-difference estimates were obtained for the six 
counterfactual models on four socioeconomic outcomes: 2000 to 2009-2013 change in (a) 
log of median family income, (b) unemployment, (d) poverty, and (e) log of median 
home value. The DD estimates for the counterfactual models were obtained through the 
following equations:   
Model 1: NMTC and LIHTC versus NMTC alone: 
Y = β0 + β1both_dum + β2NMTC_amt + β3controls + β4black10 + β5County + ε 
Model 2: NMTC and LIHTC versus LIHTC alone: 
Y = β0 + β1both_dum + β2LIHTC_amt + β3controls + β4black10 + β5County + ε 
Model 3: NMTC and LIHTC versus neither: 
Y = β0 + β1both_dum + β2controls + β3black10 + β4County + ε 
Model 4: NMTC only versus LIHTC only:  
Y = β0 + β1NMTC_dum + β2controls + β3black10+ β4County + ε 
Model 5: NMTC only versus neither 
Y = β0 + β1NMTC_dum + β2controls + β3black10 + β4County + ε 
Model 6: LIHTC only versus neither:  
Y = β0 + β1LIHTC_dum + β2controls + β3black10 +β4County + ε,  
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Where Y represents the four socioeconomic outcomes listed above, and the variables 
both_dum, NMTC_dum, and LIHTC_dum are dummy variables coded to one if a census 
tract received the treatment condition, and zero if it received the comparison condition. 
Thus, the models estimate the effects of receiving some above-threshold (>$100,000) 
amount of investment through both programs (Models 1-3), NMTC (Model 4 & 5), or 
LIHTC (Model 6), relative to the comparison condition.  
The makeup of the comparison groups in models 1 and 2 necessitated the 
inclusion of the variables NMTC_amt and LIHTC_amt to account for the dollar amount 
of investment received by the comparison group through NMTC (model 1) and LIHTC 
(model 2). In model 1, both the treatment and comparison groups received investment 
through NMTC. In model 2, both groups received LIHTC. Ideally, I would have matched 
the census tracts in the treatment group to comparison census tracts that received similar 
amounts of investment through NMTC (model 1) or LIHTC (model 2). Unfortunately, 
investment amounts for both programs varied widely from tract to tract, and were 
uncorrelated with the other pretreatment attributes used to calculate the propensity scores. 
As a result, attempts to include measures of NMTC and LIHTC investment amounts in 
the matching procedures threw off the balance between the treatment and comparison 
groups on other important pretreatment variables. Thus, it was necessary to control for 
differences in investment intensity at this stage. If NMTC_amt and LIHTC_amt were not 
included in the equations for models 1 and 2, then observed differences in the outcomes 
of the treatment and comparison groups might be explained more by large differences in 
the amount of investment received by the treatment and comparison groups through the 
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program that both groups received than by the addition of investment through the 
program that only the treatment group received. 
The variable controls includes the eleven variables listed earlier used to obtain the 
propensity scores. Because it is rarely the case that propensity scores produce exact 
matches for all observations on all relevant variables, including these variables in the 
final regression equations accounts for any remaining differences between the treatment 
and comparison observations. Two additional control variables were included, black10 
and County. 
First, black10 is the percentage point change in the black population from 2000 to 
2009-2013. Recent research demonstrates that the process of neighborhood 
socioeconomic ascent may occur through one or more of several distinct pathways 
(Owens, 2012; Van Criekingen & Decroly, 2003). In the context of concentrated poverty, 
the most well-known of these pathways is the classic gentrification process in which 
ascent occurs through the displacement of the traditional, often minority residents of a 
distressed neighborhood by wealthier, and typically white newcomers. Given that one of 
the criticisms of place-based investment is that resources are often siphoned off by 
unintended beneficiaries before they are able to reach the intended beneficiaries (Crane & 
Manville, 2008; Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2008; Gurley-Calvez et al., 2009)- i.e., the current 
residents of targeted areas, it is important to distinguish between different pathways of 
ascent. The purpose of the variable black10 is to control for improved socioeconomic 
conditions in poor neighborhoods resulting from the displacement of current residents.  
 Second, the factor variable County controls for county fixed effects. A 
neighborhood’s socioeconomic trajectory is a function of the changes it experiences 
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directly, such as those that result from NMTC or LIHTC investment, as well as the social, 
political, geographic, and economic realities of the surrounding area (Galster, 2001). 
Thus, it was important to control for potentially vast regional differences that are 
consequential for socioeconomic outcomes.  
4.3 Results 
The quality of the matches in the six counterfactual models was assessed using 
the best practices suggested by Ho, Imai, and King (Ho et al., 2007); adjustments were 
made to the specification of the matching model until a combination of variables was 
identified that produced good balance on key pretreatment variables for all six treatment-
comparison groups. The tables in the appendix provide descriptive statistics for the 
counterfactual models before and after matching. T-tests were also performed to establish 
that the differences between the matched treatment and comparison groups were 
insignificant. In this respect, the matching procedure was unable to remove all significant 
differences on all variables in some of the models; however, these remaining differences 
were for the most part inconsequential in a practical sense. For example, before 
conducting the matching procedure for counterfactual model 1 (treatment: both NMTC 
and LIHTC; comparison: NMTC only), the mean poverty rates of the treatment and 
comparison groups were 30.5 percent and 25.3 percent, respectively. Though the 
matching procedure eliminated more than half of the original distance between the groups 
(new mean poverty rates of 27.2 percent for treatment group and 25.1 percent for 
comparison group), the t-test still indicated that the two groups were significantly 
different on this important pretreatment attribute. However, there is little substantive 
difference between a census tract with a poverty rate of 27.2 percent and one with a 
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poverty rate of 25.1, in terms of either NMTC or LIHTC provisions, developer 
preferences, likely socioeconomic trajectory, or the ability of an observer to detect the 
differences. Furthermore, the inclusion of year 2000 poverty rate in the final regression 
equation cancels out this remaining imbalance. The empirical results are presented from 
Table 19 to Table 24.  
Table 19 estimates the differences in socioeconomic outcomes between census 
tracts that received only NMTC investment and those that received the same amount of 
NMTC investment plus some above-threshold (>$100,000) amount of LIHTC 
investment. It finds that the addition of LIHTC-subsidized housing had no significant 
impact in either direction on the socioeconomic outcomes of census tracts that were 
targeted by NMTC alone. 
However, the significant NMTC spending coefficient on the equation looking at 
2000 to 2009-2013 unemployment change indicates that every $100,000 of NMTC 
investment reduced unemployment change by .006 percentage points, regardless of 
whether LIHTC was received. On average, unemployment rose in this sample by 2.01 
percent. Given that the average NMTC investment amount was $9.5 million, 
unemployment would have risen by an additional .57 percentage points (.006 * 95) over 
the course of the 2000s were it not for NMTC spillovers.   
 
 
 
Table 19. Treatment Effects Both vs. NMTC 
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 Dependent variable: 
 MFI Poverty Unemployment Home Values 
Treatment:NMTC and LIHTC 0.040 -0.352 0.436 -0.006 
 (0.045) (1.316) (0.827) (0.046) 
NMTC (per $100,000) 0.0001 -0.001 -0.006** 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0001) 
Constant -0.743* 60.790*** 24.175*** -0.022 
 (0.413) (12.149) (7.635) (0.423) 
Observations 308 308 308 308 
R2 0.666 0.707 0.808 0.697 
Adjusted R2 0.401 0.474 0.655 0.455 
Residual Std. Error (df = 171) 0.261 7.683 4.828 0.268 
F Statistic (df = 136; 171) 2.508*** 3.030*** 5.282*** 2.886*** 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
Table 20 estimates the differences in socioeconomic outcomes for census tracts 
that received only LIHTC investment and those that received the same amount of LIHTC 
investment plus some above-threshold level of NMTC investment. It finds that the 
injection of NMTC-subsidized development yielded improved outcomes in poverty rate 
change. This finding supports the hypothesis that NMTC-subsidized development 
improves socioeconomic outcomes in distressed neighborhoods. On the other hand, it 
does not necessarily say anything about the effects of LIHTC investment. After 
controlling for NMTC investment and other relevant neighborhood factors, increasing 
amounts of LIHTC spending had no significant influence on census tract socioeconomic 
change in this sample.  
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Table 20. Treatment Effects Both vs. LIHTC 
 Dependent variable: 
 MFI Poverty Unemployment Home Values 
Treatment:NMTC and LIHTC 0.040 -3.824*** -0.586 0.040 
 (0.043) (1.132) (0.807) (0.051) 
LIHTC (per $100,000) 0.0001 -0.033 0.035 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.057) (0.041) (0.003) 
Constant -0.225 37.689*** 25.080*** 0.471 
 (0.298) (7.795) (5.556) (0.351) 
Observations 316 316 316 316 
R2 0.690 0.698 0.783 0.633 
Adjusted R2 0.425 0.440 0.598 0.321 
Residual Std. Error (df = 170) 0.273 7.149 5.096 0.322 
F Statistic (df = 145; 170) 2.606*** 2.707*** 4.235*** 2.025*** 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table 21 estimates the differences in outcomes for census tracts that received 
above-threshold amounts of investment through both NMTC and LIHTC, compared to 
otherwise comparable census tracts that were not targeted by either program. In this 
scenario, it was found that being targeted by both programs had a positive impact on both 
income and poverty outcomes. While my original prediction was that the revitalizing 
effects of NMTC investment would be canceled out by the poverty concentrating effects 
of LIHTC investment, it may instead be the case that NMTC and LIHTC together created 
a critical mass of new investment that catalyzed the revitalization process. Another 
possibility is that because the average amount of NMTC investment received by the 
treatment group was considerably higher than LIHTC (NMTC: $11.1 million; LIHTC: 
$955,000), the positive effects of NMTC outweighed any negative effects of LIHTC 
investment.  
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Table 21. Treatment Effects Both vs. Neither 
 Dependent variable: 
 MFI Poverty Unemployment Home Values 
Treatment:NMTC and LIHTC 0.113* -3.745** -0.852 0.005 
 (0.059) (1.655) (0.883) (0.054) 
Constant -1.186** 57.797*** 33.974*** 0.921** 
 (0.474) (13.203) (7.041) (0.428) 
Observations 326 326 326 326 
R2 0.627 0.599 0.813 0.675 
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.234 0.643 0.378 
Residual Std. Error (df = 170) 0.328 9.140 4.874 0.297 
F Statistic (df = 155; 170) 1.840*** 1.642*** 4.771*** 2.276*** 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01   
 
  
Table 22 considers what would have happened if a census tract that received 
above-threshold LIHTC investment had instead receive above-threshold NMTC 
investment. This counterfactual finds that replacing LIHTC with NMTC had significant 
benefits for both income and home value change.  
 
Table 22. Treatment Effects NMTC vs. LIHTC 
 Dependent variable: 
 MFI Poverty Unemployment Home Values 
Treatment: NMTC Only 0.075*** -0.087 -0.508 0.049** 
 (0.024) (0.701) (0.479) (0.024) 
Constant -0.506** 51.144*** 20.601*** 0.245 
 (0.216) (6.395) (4.368) (0.217) 
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Observations 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104 
R2 0.491 0.539 0.687 0.560 
Adjusted R2 0.284 0.351 0.559 0.381 
Residual Std. Error (df = 784) 0.279 8.282 5.657 0.282 
F Statistic (df = 319; 784) 2.373*** 2.869*** 5.388*** 3.126*** 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table 23 and Table 24 show the effects of receiving above-threshold amounts of 
NMTC and LIHTC investment, respectively, relative to the counterfactual condition of 
receiving no investment through either program. Table 23 finds that home values rose 
more in census tracts that received NMTC, while Table 24 finds that LIHTC investment 
was responsible for weaker income growth and a sharper increase in poverty.  
 
Table 23. Treatment Effects NMTC vs. Neither 
 Dependent variable: 
 MFI Poverty Unemployment Home Values 
Treatment:NMTC Only -0.007 0.075 -0.544 0.050** 
 (0.022) (0.688) (0.423) (0.021) 
Constant -0.376 46.529*** 28.485*** 0.225 
 (0.246) (7.531) (4.629) (0.234) 
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,128 
R2 0.464 0.453 0.649 0.577 
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.241 0.513 0.412 
Residual Std. Error (df = 811) 0.286 8.752 5.380 0.272 
F Statistic (df = 316; 811) 2.219*** 2.129*** 4.751*** 3.499*** 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 24. Treatment Effects LIHTC vs. Neither 
 Dependent variable: 
 MFI Poverty Unemployment Home Values 
Treatment:LIHTC Only -0.022** 0.643* 0.027 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.350) (0.257) (0.011) 
Constant -0.067 39.343*** 21.766*** 0.258 
 (0.195) (6.523) (4.799) (0.196) 
Observations 3,192 3,192 3,192 3,192 
R2 0.395 0.436 0.549 0.546 
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.331 0.465 0.461 
Residual Std. Error (df = 2690) 0.253 8.469 6.230 0.255 
F Statistic (df = 501; 2690) 3.500*** 4.152*** 6.532*** 6.448*** 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
 
4.4 Discussion 
This chapter investigated the effects of being targeted by either NMTC or LIHTC 
in census tracts that otherwise received investment through the other program or that 
were targeted by neither NMTC nor LIHTC, on the socioeconomic trajectories of 
distressed places. 
In the only similar study on NMTC to date, Freedman (2012) found that NMTC 
eligibility had modest positive impacts on income and poverty change. This study 
supports those earlier findings, as in three of the four counterfactual scenarios where the 
treatment involved the addition of NMTC investment into a census tract, change in the 
desired direction was observed for one or both of these indicators. The current study is 
also the first to find evidence of NMTC investment’s positive impacts on local home 
values. Of the four indicators investigated, the only one for which NMTC was not found 
to have any significant impact was change in the unemployment rate.  
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The findings tell a more nuanced story about the socioeconomic effects of LIHTC 
investment. In three of the models, the treatment involved LIHTC investment in a census 
tract. In the scenario where LIHTC investment was an addition to NMTC investment 
(Table 22), LIHTC was found to have no significant impact on socioeconomic change. 
When LIHTC investment occurred in conjunction with NMTC investment in places that 
were otherwise not targeted by either program, positive socioeconomic changes were 
observed. When the counterfactual condition involved no place-based treatment, the 
addition of LIHTC investment led to worse outcomes in terms of both income and 
poverty. In other words, there were contexts in which the implications of LIHTC 
investment in a poor neighborhood were negligible, positive, and negative.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
This dissertation explored the various poverty contexts that place-based programs 
like NMTC and LIHTC are tasked to address, identified the neighborhood attributes most 
important for determining whether a distressed census tract is likely to be targeted for 
place-based investment, and estimated the effects of those investments on local 
socioeconomic conditions with the understanding that different sources of place-based 
investment may gravitate towards the same kinds of distressed places.   
Chapter 3 found that local levels of human capital and distress, urbanization, and 
the degree to which the populations of poor neighborhoods are racially segregated are the 
three neighborhood dimensions that are the main sources of variation among poor places. 
The cluster analysis delineated distressed census tracts according to these dimensions and 
revealed the existence of ten distinct and interpretable types of poor neighborhoods. The 
neighborhood types with the highest concentrations of census tracts that received NMTC 
and LIHTC investment were those that experienced the best socioeconomic outcomes 
during the 2000s. This finding supports the assumptions made in previous research on 
both programs that developers seek out distressed places that are well-positioned to 
experience socioeconomic ascent.  
A census tract’s initial level of urbanization was strongly associated both with 
subsequent socioeconomic change and subsequent place-based investment through 
NMTC and LIHTC. No other observed attribute or dimension was related to these 
processes. Therefore, urbanization, which in this study refers to a combination of 
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population, housing, and proximity features, including low levels of homeownership, a 
high proportion of housing in apartments and other multi-unit structures, low relative 
income, high relative home values values, and high relative population density, is likely 
to be closely related to the latent construct of “developer preferences,” and thus an 
important determinant of treatment selection.  
With a deeper understanding of the unobserved treatment selection processes that 
steer NMTC and LIHTC into similar types of distressed places, Chapter 4 estimated the 
effects of investments made through these programs in their shared space. Six 
counterfactual models were examined, each of which examined the effects of adding 
either NMTC or LIHTC investment into a census tract that received the other program or 
that was not targeted by either program. In every case where the treatment involved the 
addition of NMTC investment in a census tract, there was evidence of socioeconomic 
gains on at least one indicator. In contrast, increased poverty and lower income were 
observed when LIHTC investment was the treatment. The only exception to this was the 
model that compared the effects of receiving both NMTC and LIHTC treatment to no 
treatment through either program. In this case, being targeted by both programs had 
significant benefits in terms of both poverty and income change.  
5.2 Limitations of Study 
This research ran up against two main limitations, both related to the data used to 
represent neighborhoods. Neighborhood is a complex, multifaceted concept, and there 
was simply no way to build neighborhood profiles using available tract-level data that 
incorporated every important aspect of a neighborhood’s being. Because this study 
looked at areas of socioeconomic distress in metropolitan areas throughout the US, I was 
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limited to using universally available census tract data. While Galster (Galster, 2001) 
identifies at least ten distinct types of neighborhood attributes, I conceptualized 
neighborhoods around the four attribute types for which suitable indicators were readily 
available- demographic, class status, housing, and relative location/proximity 
characteristics. However, these sorts of data limitations are all but unavoidable in 
neighborhood research, particularly in a geographically expansive study such as this. 
Still, dozens of tract-level variables are available through the census, and it is 
possible to construct dozens more through various combinations and permutations. 
Despite the availability of many more variables for describing neighborhood attributes, I 
selected 13 neighborhood variables for inclusion in the PCA. By comparison, using the 
same two-step approach to develop a typology of inner-ring suburban census tracts, 
Hanlon (Hanlon, 2009) entered 44 variables into PCA to uncover neighborhood 
dimensions. However, I found that PCA was most successful at producing coherent 
neighborhood dimensions with a limited set of theoretically relevant indicators. After 
dozens of iterations, I found that the 13 variables included in the PCA struck a strong 
balance between comprehensiveness and coherence.   
On the other hand, there is certainly room to argue that I left some key pieces of 
information relevant for understanding neighborhood socioeconomic trajectories on the 
table. Specifically, the included variables are all static indicators of a census tract’s 
characteristics at a specific point in time. I did not include any dynamic variables 
representing the recent history and trajectory leading up to the start of the study period in 
2000. This is a legitimate concern because neighborhood typologies often incorporate 
dynamic measures, and several recent typologies have focused on the evolution of 
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neighborhood structure and the pathways of socioeconomic ascent over the course of 
decades (Delmelle, 2015, 2017; Owens, 2012).  
I originally intended to include 1990-2000 change in home value as one of the 
variables for identifying neighborhood dimensions, as previous research suggests that the 
direction in which LIHTC pushes socioeconomic outcomes may depend on whether a 
census tract was ascending, stable, or declining at the time of the investment (Baum-
Snow & Marion, 2009). However, this change variable was not sufficiently correlated 
with any of the static year 2000 variables. As a result, when it was included in the PCA it 
tended to load highly on a component by itself, muddying its interpretation and limiting 
its usefulness as a meaningful neighborhood dimension. When that failed, I tried to 
instead include it in the cluster analysis, alongside with the three meaningful dimensions 
that were identified. Again, its inclusion made the interpretation of distinct and 
meaningful neighborhood types difficult. Thus, I settled for using it as one of the 
matching variables in the second empirical chapter. In the end, the set of static variables 
for this study produced interpretable and theory-backed neighborhood dimensions and 
neighborhood types. Furthermore, ensuring that treated and comparison tracts had similar 
trajectories leading up to the treatment selection period is the most important use of this 
dynamic variable for the goals of this study.  
5.3 Policy Implications 
 Understanding how place-based resources are distributed among eligible areas is 
important for several reasons. Concentrated poverty has increased since 2000, and more 
than 70 million people now live in a census tract in which at least 20 percent of their 
neighbors are poor (P. A. Jargowsky, 2013).  Unfortunately, the resources available for 
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addressing this widespread problem are limited, so it is critical that programs like NMTC 
and LIHTC target places where they can have the biggest possible impact on local 
conditions. This raises the fundamental question of whether priority should be on 
moderately distressed places that are well-positioned to leverage NMTC- or LIHTC-
investment as a catalyst for sustained private investment and revitalization or on places 
struggling with extreme levels of socioeconomic distress with the greatest overall need 
for a variety of sustained policy interventions. This research supports the unsurprising 
argument that the market actors that utilize these programs prioritize the former. 
However, the relatively low levels of NMTC and LIHTC investment in high-density 
neighborhood types that were only moderately distressed suggests that both programs 
have in place effective combinations of incentives and disincentives for moderating the 
motivation for developers to seek out the most stable and urbanized eligible locations, 
and make investments into a much wider range of distressed places.     
 From an evaluation perspective, the deep parallels in the treatment selection 
processes guiding NMTC and LIHTC suggests the need for more integrated and nuanced 
assessments of these types of programs. This study did not provide a conclusive answer 
to the question of whether LIHTC investment into poor neighborhoods improves local 
conditions or mainly serves to reinforce existing patterns of concentrated poverty. 
However, it did find that the addition of LIHTC activity in a census tract generally had a 
modest negative impact on indicators used to judge the effectiveness of these sorts of 
programs. Thus, the revitalizing effects of NMTC and the poverty-concentrating effects 
of LIHTC are likely to cancel each other out, at least partially, unless explicit steps are 
taken to account for their underlying similarities. 
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However, NMTC and LIHTC are just the tip of the place-based iceberg. There are 
many other federal, state, and local programs that, just like NMTC and LIHTC, harness 
market forces to address the market failures that have left many distressed places 
chronically cut off from critical financial resources. Thus, controlling for the presence of 
LIHTC activity when estimating the effects of NMTC investment, and vice versa, is a 
first step towards research designs that better consider the underlying neighborhood 
factors that are likely to attract place-based investment from multiple sources beyond 
these two programs.  
 Recognizing the difficulty of fully representing the complicated policy 
environment in poor neighborhoods, a more nuanced take on the concept of success is 
also warranted. For all their similarities, NMTC and LIHTC address different problems. 
It may not be reasonable to expect that the economic and community development focus 
of NMTC would produce the same kinds of neighborhood changes as LIHTC, which 
addresses the undersupply of quality affordable housing options for poor residents, even 
if both programs are functioning as intended. Therefore, the socioeconomic change 
variables used in this and similar studies as indicators of program impact should be 
interpreted with the understanding that defining success in the context of a problem as 
complex and multifaceted as neighborhood poverty involves several considerations, not 
all of which are easy to measure.  
5.4 Directions for Future Research 
 The research carried out in this dissertation provides numerous jumping off points 
for further exploring the various contexts of neighborhood poverty, the problems arising 
in these areas that place-based programs like NMTC and LIHTC are intended to address, 
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the relationships between different sources of place-based investment, and methods for 
evaluating place-based programs that integrate multiple investment sources into a single 
analytical framework. Perhaps the most natural first step forward from here would be to 
reconsider the questions driving this research in the various poverty contexts this study 
revealed. For instance, within each neighborhood type, does it still hold true that the 
urbanization dimension is the common thread that explains NMTC investment, LIHTC 
investment, and socioeconomic ascent? Or are there other neighborhood attributes or 
dimensions that are better at explaining these processes in some neighborhood types? 
Along the same lines, are there variations in the effects of NMTC and LIHTC investment 
across neighborhood types? Are there some poverty contexts in which the revitalizing 
forces of LIHTC-subsidized development outweigh the poverty-concentrating forces? 
Similarly, are the socioeconomic benefits of NMTC investment relatively evenly 
distributed across neighborhood types, or are they concentrated within just a few select 
types of poor census tracts?  
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APPENDIX 
Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC and LIHTC 
Investment Versus NMTC Investment Alone 
 Before Matching  After Matching 
Variable Name Both NMTC  Both NMTC 
n 172 568  160 160 
Income $39,635 $40,944  $39,558 $39,534 
Tract/Metro Income 52.22 55.49  51.99 52.69 
Poverty Rate 30.14 28.39  30.16 31.20 
Unemployment Rate 12.77 11.96  12.78 12.54 
Pct. Females in Labor Force 50.64 52.58  50.50 51.43 
Pct. White 35.10 36.68  33.81 39.02 
Pct. Black 27.78 32.11  27.35 24.15 
Pct. Hispanic 28.64 24.75  30.10 28.92 
Pct. Asian 6.35 4.27  6.59 5.53 
Pct. Foreign born 20.69 17.91  21.57 21.62 
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less 61.77 63.97  62.70 64.70 
Pct. Bachelors or More 14.79 13.57  14.11 14.45 
Pct. Households Female-headed 26.66 26.36  26.82 25.69 
Tract/Metro Pop. Density 143 152  147 155 
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied 29.43 35.61  30.49 30.05 
Pct. Housing Multi-unit 62.87 54.29  61.40 60.81 
Pct. Housing Vacant 9.91 10.50  9.57 8.94 
Tract/Metro Median Home 
Value 73.41 66.51  68.07 65.18 
Urbanization Index Score 0.59 0.28  0.54 0.52 
Tract/Metro Median Home 
Value 0.73 0.67  0.68 0.65 
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC and LIHTC 
Investment Versus LIHTC Investment Alone 
 Before Matching  After Matching 
Variable Name Both LIHTC  Both LIHTC 
n 172 1662  163 163 
Income $39,635 $40,210  $39,595 $39,137 
Tract/Metro Income 52.22 55.32  52.12 51.34 
Poverty Rate 30.14 29.16  29.91 30.11 
Unemployment Rate 12.77 12.59  12.68 12.99 
Pct. Females in Labor Force 50.64 51.44  50.60 51.36 
Pct. White 35.10 30.37  34.65 31.75 
Pct. Black 27.78 36.97  27.41 28.99 
Pct. Hispanic 28.64 26.51  29.33 31.88 
Pct. Asian 6.35 4.66  6.44 5.71 
Pct. Foreign born 20.69 18.77  21.16 22.89 
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less 61.77 64.90  62.39 64.52 
Pct. Bachelors or More 14.79 11.97  14.42 12.67 
Pct. Households Female-headed 26.66 28.07  26.61 28.64 
Tract/Metro Pop. Density 143 168  145 167 
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied 29.43 37.80  30.47 28.29 
Pct. Housing Multi-unit 62.87 50.06  61.51 62.38 
Pct. Housing Vacant 9.91 9.80  9.88 9.10 
Tract/Metro Median Home 
Value 73.41 64.44  68.42 68.51 
Urbanization Index Score 0.59 0.23  0.53 0.63 
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC and LIHTC 
Investment Versus No Treatment 
 Before Matching  After Matching 
Variable Name Both Neither  Both Neither 
n 172 12327  169 169 
Income $39,635 $43,742  $39,618 $38,828 
Tract/Metro Income 52.22 60.44  52.22 51.05 
Poverty Rate 30.14 25.24  30.24 31.80 
Unemployment Rate 12.77 10.61  12.70 12.95 
Pct. Females in Labor Force 50.64 52.62  50.67 52.68 
Pct. White 35.10 36.43  34.65 35.15 
Pct. Black 27.78 30.70  27.71 25.88 
Pct. Hispanic 28.64 26.77  29.08 31.29 
Pct. Asian 6.35 4.34  6.41 5.90 
Pct. Foreign born 20.69 19.40  20.95 24.49 
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less 61.77 63.64  62.05 63.74 
Pct. Bachelors or More 14.79 13.15  14.60 14.49 
Pct. Households Female-headed 26.66 23.64  26.69 26.33 
Tract/Metro Pop. Density 143 166  143 152 
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied 29.43 45.25  29.79 30.25 
Pct. Housing Multi-unit 62.87 43.67  62.31 62.54 
Pct. Housing Vacant 9.91 9.25  9.91 8.95 
Tract/Metro Median Home 
Value 0.73 0.66  0.72 0.70 
Urbanization Index Score 0.59 -0.07  0.57 0.61 
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC Investment Versus 
LIHTC Investment 
 Before Matching  After Matching 
Variable Name NMTC LIHTC  NMTC LIHTC 
n 568 1662  552 552 
Income $40,944 $40,210  $40,817 $39,233 
Tract/Metro Income 55.49 55.32  55.30 54.33 
Poverty Rate 28.39 29.16  28.34 30.10 
Unemployment Rate 11.96 12.59  11.92 12.75 
Pct. Females in Labor Force 52.58 51.44  52.58 50.60 
Pct. White 36.68 30.37  36.03 33.13 
Pct. Black 32.11 36.97  32.38 35.40 
Pct. Hispanic 24.75 26.51  25.12 25.39 
Pct. Asian 4.27 4.66  4.31 4.67 
Pct. Foreign born 17.91 18.77  18.12 19.00 
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less 63.97 64.90  64.12 64.77 
Pct. Bachelors or More 13.57 11.97  13.47 12.43 
Pct. Households Female-headed 26.36 28.07  26.50 28.17 
Tract/Metro Pop. Density 152 168  154 161 
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied 35.61 37.80  36.01 34.76 
Pct. Housing Multi-unit 54.29 50.06  53.75 53.94 
Pct. Housing Vacant 10.50 9.80  10.41 10.06 
Tract/Metro Median Home 
Value 0.67 0.64  0.65 0.66 
Urbanization Index Score 0.28 0.23  0.26 0.33 
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC Investment Versus No 
Treatment 
 Before Matching  After Matching 
Variable Name NMTC Neither  NMTC Neither 
n 568 12327  564 564 
Income $40,944 $43,742  $40,830 $40,770 
Tract/Metro Income 55.49 60.44  55.34 55.00 
Poverty Rate 28.39 25.24  28.39 28.53 
Unemployment Rate 11.96 10.61  11.94 11.87 
Pct. Females in Labor Force 52.58 52.62  52.57 51.94 
Pct. White 36.68 36.43  36.58 35.08 
Pct. Black 32.11 30.70  32.18 33.14 
Pct. Hispanic 24.75 26.77  24.79 25.73 
Pct. Asian 4.27 4.34  4.27 4.36 
Pct. Foreign born 17.91 19.40  17.93 19.68 
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less 63.97 63.64  64.01 63.38 
Pct. Bachelors or More 13.57 13.15  13.53 13.69 
Pct. Households Female-headed 26.36 23.64  26.46 26.64 
Tract/Metro Pop. Density 152 166  153 156 
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied 35.61 45.25  35.82 34.90 
Pct. Housing Multi-unit 54.29 43.67  54.01 55.43 
Pct. Housing Vacant 10.50 9.25  10.46 9.93 
Tract/Metro Median Home 
Value 0.67 0.66  0.66 0.66 
Urbanization Index Score 0.28 -0.07  0.27 0.32 
Tract/Metro Median Home 
Value 0.02 -0.02  0.01 0.01 
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: LIHTC Investment Versus No 
Treatment 
 Before Matching  After Matching 
Variable Name LIHTC Neither  LIHTC Neither 
n 1662 12327  1660 1660 
Income $40,210 $43,742  $40,221 $40,170 
Tract/Metro Income 55.32 60.44  55.32 55.49 
Poverty Rate 29.16 25.24  29.14 29.17 
Unemployment Rate 12.59 10.61  12.59 12.39 
Pct. Females in Labor Force 51.44 52.62  51.44 51.79 
Pct. White 30.37 36.43  30.35 29.21 
Pct. Black 36.97 30.70  37.01 37.10 
Pct. Hispanic 26.51 26.77  26.53 28.04 
Pct. Asian 4.66 4.34  4.63 4.12 
Pct. Foreign born 18.77 19.40  18.76 19.16 
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less 64.90 63.64  64.92 65.16 
Pct. Bachelors or More 11.97 13.15  11.96 12.13 
Pct. Households Female-headed 28.07 23.64  28.06 27.51 
Tract/Metro Pop. Density 168 166  168 167 
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied 37.80 45.25  37.83 38.40 
Pct. Housing Multi-unit 50.06 43.67  50.09 48.55 
Pct. Housing Vacant 9.80 9.25  9.81 9.80 
Tract/Metro Median Home 
Value 0.64 0.66  0.64 0.64 
Urbanization Index Score 0.23 -0.07  0.23 0.20 
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